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Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness 
Lauryn P. Gouldin∗ 
There is a growing national consensus about the urgent need to shrink 
the population of pretrial detainees and to fix our broken money bail 
system. Even as scholars and reformers are showing renewed interest in 
pretrial detention and bail, however, they have neglected a fundamental 
pretrial problem: the conflation (by judges and in statutes) of flight risk 
and danger. Reformers have offered up an array of proposals and 
increasingly sophisticated risk assessment tools that promise to improve 
judicial decision-making, but many of these tools merge flight risk and 
danger in ways that reinforce problematic legislative and 
judicial practices. 
This Article identifies the legal and practical reasons that judges 
must evaluate flight risk independently of danger. Federal and state 
constitutions and statutes include detention and bail provisions that 
require judges to make separate determinations of flight risk and 
dangerousness. There are also compelling policy arguments for separating 
flight from danger. First, combining risks may cause judges to 
overestimate both kinds of risks. Second, forcing separate analyses of 
pretrial risks may provide judges with much-needed political cover 
(alleviating pressure to detain). In addition, isolating the two types of 
risks offers an opportunity to improve judicial accountability and system 
legitimacy. Finally, the conditions of release that judges employ to 
mitigate flight risk are different from those that are used to manage 
danger. Disentangling flight risk from dangerousness will be a critical 
piece of efforts to improve pretrial decision-making and reduce 
unnecessary pretrial detention. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On any given day, jails in the United States hold an average of over 
450,000 pretrial detainees.1 There is a growing consensus that reforms 
are urgently needed to reduce our overreliance on pretrial detention 
and that our nationwide money bail crisis has reached a “tipping 
point.”2 Federal, state, and local officials are increasingly vocal about 
the deeply flawed structures and policies that have led to a near-
doubling of annual jail admissions over the last three decades.3 
By most accounts, we are now well into what has been called the 
third generation of bail reform.4 As with other criminal justice reform 
efforts, the range of different bail reform efforts percolating around 
the country is driven by a mix of moral outrage and economic reality. 
 
 1. Todd D. Minton and Zhen Zeng, Jail Inmates at Midyear 2014, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE at 3 (June 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf (indicating that 
the number of unconvicted jail inmates increased from 453,200 at midyear 2013 to 457,500 at 
midyear 2014). The United States now leads the world in the total number of individuals 
detained before trial. Roy Walmsley, World Prison Brief, Pre-Trial/Remand Prison Population: 
Trend, United States, PRISON STUDIES, http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/united-states-
america (last visited Mar. 2, 2016) (pre-trial population of 453,200 as of 2013). 
 2. Lisa Foster, Dir., Office for Access to Justice, Remarks at ABA’s 11th Annual Summit on 
Public Defense (Feb. 6, 2016) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/director-
lisa-foster-office-access-justice-delivers-remarks-aba-s-11th-annual-summit) (describing consensus 
that current bail practices are “deeply troubling”). 
 3. RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION’S FRONT 
DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 7, 45 (2015) (stating that jail admissions increased 
from “six million in 1983 to 11.7 million in 2013”). 
 4. KRISTIN BECHTEL ET AL., PRETRIAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, DISPELLING THE MYTHS: 
WHAT POLICY MAKERS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT PRETRIAL RESEARCH 2 n.1 (2012) (noting 
that since 2000, there has been an increase in focus on the pretrial portion of the criminal 
process, referred to as the “third wave” of bail reform—the first wave beginning in the 1960s, 
the second beginning in the 1980s); Timothy R. Schnacke, Claire M.B. Booker & Michael R. 
Jones, The Third Generation of Bail Reform, DENV. U. L. REV. (Mar. 14, 2011), 
http://www.denverlawreview.org/online-articles/2011/3/14/the-third-generation-of-bail-
reform.html (“[J]urisdictions across the country are [implementing], in a wave of legislation, 
policy changes, and various projects aimed at improving pretrial justice.”). 
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It is apparent that we cannot afford our bloated, wealth-based pretrial 
detention system. We also cannot abide it.5 
Many current reforms attack the ways that bail amounts are set 
and push for greater reliance on nonfinancial conditions of release. In 
2015 and 2016, plaintiffs successfully waged class action challenges to 
existing money bail systems in a number of jurisdictions.6 The 
Department of Justice stated the problem plainly in the first sentence 
of a Statement of Interest that it filed in the first of those lawsuits: 
“Incarcerating individuals solely because of their inability to pay for 
their release, whether through the payment of fines, fees, or a cash 
bond, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”7 Other reforms focus on who pays bail, including 
efforts to prohibit commercial bail8 and increased use of community-
supported bail funds.9 
 
 5. As United States Attorney General Loretta Lynch explained in a December 2015 
speech, “When bail is set unreasonably high, people are behind bars only because they are poor. 
Not because they’re a danger or a flight risk—only because they are poor.” Loretta Lynch, U.S. 
Attorney Gen., Remarks at White House Convening on Incarceration and Poverty (Dec. 3, 
2015) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-loretta-e-
lynch-delivers-remarks-white-house-convening-incarceration-and); see also Complaint at 7, 
Buffin v. City of San Francisco, No. 15-cv-4959 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2015) (challenging 
“wealth-based detention”); cf. Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, 
Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1299 (2012) (“[T]he 
decision to imprison a defendant before trial all too often hinges on wealth and power.”). 
 6. For a more detailed discussion of these class-action litigation efforts, see infra 
Section I.C.4. 
 7. Statement of Interest at 1, Varden v. City of Dayton, No. 2:15-cv-34 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 
3, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/file/340461/download. This Statement of Interest has since 
been cited in bail challenges across the country. See Foster, supra note 2. 
 8. Commercial bail bondsmen or commercial sureties provide bail to defendants for a 
price and have, over time, become a fixture in American criminal justice. Efforts to reform bail 
are frequently challenged by lobbyists for these companies. The Open Society Institute is one of 
a number of groups that advocates for abolition of these for-profit bail enterprises. See generally 
JUSTICE POLICY INST., FINDING DIRECTION: EXPANDING CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPTIONS BY 
CONSIDERING POLICIES OF OTHER NATIONS 1–3, 20 (2011), http://www. 
justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/pretrial_detention_and_remand_to_custo
dy.pdf (observing that other countries like Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, and England 
do not permit commercial bail). 
 9. In 2015, the New York City Council recommended that the city allocate $1.4 million 
of community funds to pay “bail set at $2,000 or lower for [indigent] defendants charged with 
low-level misdemeanors . . . .” Emily Ngo, NYC Council Speaker Melissa Mark-Viverito Proposes 
Bail Fund for Indigent Defendants, NEWSDAY (June 17, 2015), 
http://www.newsday.com/news/new-york/melissa-mark-viverito-nyc-council-speaker-
proposes-bail-fund-for-indigent-defendants-1.10554795; see also Jocelyn Simonson, Bail 
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Some reforms have come from the legislature; for example, New 
Jersey made comprehensive changes to its state bail laws in 2014 to 
shift away from reliance on money bail.10 Similar legislation is pending 
in New Mexico and has been proposed in New York.11 
One key component of many reforms has been the adoption of 
actuarial-style pretrial risk assessment tools. These tools promise to 
improve judges’ pretrial calculations of the likelihood that a released 
defendant will either fail to appear for trial (“flight risk”)12 or commit 
other crimes (“public safety risk” or “dangerousness”).13 By 2015, 
approximately ten percent of jurisdictions in the United States had 
adopted some sort of empirically-based risk assessment tool, and that 
number continues to rise.14 
All of these reforms work toward either (or both) of two 
overlapping goals: (i) reducing the population of pretrial detainees 
overall and/or (ii) helping judges make “smarter” pretrial decisions 
by better identifying risky defendants.15 As with past generations of 
 
Nullification (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 14–19) (on file with author) (describing the 
growing phenomenon of community bail funds in detail). See also infra Section IV.B (brief 
discussion of community bail funds). 
 10. 2014 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 31 (2014) (West) (including several new provisions 
that shift away from reliance on monetary bail); Public Question Results for 11/04/2014 – General 
Election, Constitutional Amendment to Allow a Court to Order Pretrial Detention of a Person in 
a Criminal Case, N.J. DEP’T OF STATE (Dec. 2, 2014), 
http://www.state.nj.us/state/elections/2014-results/2014-official-general-public-question-
1.pdf (amending constitution to eliminate constitutional right to bail and to permit judges to 
order pretrial detention based on public safety concerns). 
 11. Alex Goldsmith, Bail constitutional amendment compromise clears House, KRQE 
NEWS 13 (Feb. 15, 2016, 8:05 PM), http://krqe.com/2016/02/15/bail-constitutional-
amendment-compromise-clears-house/. During his most recent State of the State address, 
Governor Andrew Cuomo proposed similar reforms for New York. Andrew Cuomo, Governor 
of N.Y., 2016 State of the State  and Budget Address  (Jan. 13, 
2016),  https://www.ny.gov/programs/2016-state-state-and-budget-address. 
 12. See infra Section I.A (defining flight risk). 
 13. See infra Section I.B (defining dangerousness). 
 14. LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND. [hereinafter Arnold Found.], PUBLIC SAFETY 
ASSESSMENT, http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/initiative/criminal-justice/crime-prevention
/public-safety-assessment/; see also, e.g., Press Release, Arnold Found., Data-driven tool gives 
Harris County judges new way to assess defendants’ pretrial risk level (May 24, 2016), 
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/data-driven-tool-gives-harris-county-judges-new-way-
assess-defendants-pretrial-risk-level/(identifying additional jurisdiction adopting risk   
assessment  tool). 
 15. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BJA-2014-3874, SMART PRETRIAL DETENTION 
INITIATIVE FY 2014 COMPETITIVE GRANT ANNOUNCEMENT 6 (2014), https:// 
www.bja.gov/Funding/14SmartPretrialSol.pdf (describing federal grant program to research 
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bail reform, there seems to be general agreement that constraining or 
improving judicial discretion is a central piece of the pretrial puzzle.16 
Although risk assessment tools have been the subject of criticism,17 
their promises—to make pretrial decision-making less subjective, to 
improve risk prediction, and to alleviate pressure on judges to err on 
the side of (over)detention—are understandably appealing. 
One key problem with most of the risk assessment tools employed 
in the federal system and around the country, however, is that they 
combine flight risk and dangerousness into a single “risk of pretrial 
failure” score.18 This surprising oversight fails to address—and 
inadvertently reinforces—a significant, fundamental, and perennial 
problem with pretrial judicial decision-making that should be a central 
focus of bail reform efforts: judges’ muddling of flight risk and 
dangerousness in the pretrial process.19 
 
and support programs that use risk assessment tools to improve pretrial decision-making; 
explaining that program goals include “cost savings and public safety enhancements”); Anne 
Milgram, Why smart statistics are the key to fighting crime, TED (Jan. 2014), 
http://www.ted.com/talks/anne_milgram_why_smart_statistics_are_the_key_to_fighting_cri
me/transcript?language=en (explaining that the Arnold Foundation risk assessment research 
intends to fix “incredible system errors, where we’re incarcerating low-level, nonviolent people 
and we’re releasing high-risk, dangerous people”). 
 16. John S. Goldkamp & E. Rely Vîlcicã, Judicial Discretion and the Unfinished Agenda 
of American Bail Reform: Lessons from Philadelphia’s Evidence-Based Judicial Strategy, in 
STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY: SPECIAL ISSUE NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CRIME AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 117 (Austin Sarat ed., vol. 47, 2009) (explaining that bail reform efforts 
must include “a viable method for addressing the difficult problems of judicial discretion that 
lie at the core of bail, pretrial release, and detention problems in the United States”); JOHN 
S. GOLDKAMP & MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON, POLICY GUIDELINES FOR BAIL: AN 
EXPERIMENT IN COURT REFORM 14–15 (1985) (“The exercise of discretion by bail judges 
was of great concern to early critics of the administration of bail in the United States for two 
related reasons: the questionable purposes bail was seen to serve and the debatable criteria 
relied on by judges in arriving at their decisions.”); cf. Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 455 (2016) [hereinafter Wiseman, Fixing Bail] (describing “judicial 
discretion” as a “significant factor” in the pretrial detention crisis and observing that “when 
judges’ discretion is more constrained, it appears more defendants are released without a 
concomitant increase in crime or flight”). 
 17. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra Sections I.D.3. 
 19. This problem has been documented by bail reformers dating to the early twentieth 
century. GOLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 16, at 15 (describing studies dating to 1927 
that documented that bail was being used by judges to manage dangerousness (and not merely 
for the legitimate purpose of ensuring appearance)); Goldkamp & Vîlcicã, supra note 16, at 120–
21 (citing Caleb Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 
102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1038–39 (1954) (describing prior studies that identified that money 
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This Article asserts that judges must analyze flight risk and 
dangerousness independently. By extension, the tools that are being 
developed to aid and guide judicial risk assessment must also provide 
separate risk measures. This Article marshals constitutional, statutory, 
and policy-based arguments to illustrate why this disentangling project 
is integral to reform efforts. Although reformers have begun to focus 
on this issue,20 it has not yet been examined by the small but growing 
group of twenty-first century bail scholars.21 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background—
briefly explaining the historical role of flight risk in driving pretrial 
decisions, tracing the changes in state and federal statutes to permit 
 
bail was being used for incapacitative purposes—to accomplish sub rosa the detention of 
“dangerous” defendants—as a means to ‘break crime waves,’ or, simply, as a method for inflicting 
punishment as well as to express personal prejudice toward certain defendants). Judges’ tendency 
to merge flight risk and danger in evaluating pretrial risk continues to be a problem. See Shima 
Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 549–50 (2012) 
(explaining that “[m]ost state judges consider dangerousness at a much higher rate than flight 
risk, though most states claim to consider both factors in release decisions and some even state 
the flight risk is the primary consideration”); cf. Lauryn P. Gouldin, When Deference is 
Dangerous: The Judicial Role in Material-Witness Detentions, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1333, 1349–
60 (2012) (describing the merger of flight risk and dangerousness as part of the over-detention 
of material witnesses in the decade after September 11, 2001). 
 20. As outlined in Section I.D.3, infra, there is one pretrial risk assessment tool that 
separates flight risk from dangerousness. Although the Arnold Foundation advertises that 
feature, it does not explain why it is essential. ARNOLD FOUND., PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT: 
RISK FACTORS AND FORMULA 3, http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/
uploads/PSA-Risk-Factors-and-Formula.pdf. 
 21. For most of the nearly three decades since the Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Salerno, bail and pretrial detention have been neglected in academic literature. Shima 
Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 725–26 (2011) 
[hereinafter Baradaran, Innocence] (describing reduced scholarly attention to bail and pretrial 
detention issues in recent decades); Samuel R. Wiseman, Discrimination, Coercion, and the Bail 
Reform Act of 1984: The Loss of the Core Constitutional Protections of the Excessive Bail Clause, 36 
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 121, 123 (2009) [hereinafter Wiseman, Discrimination] (observing that 
“[t]here has been relatively little innovation in the law and scholarship on bail in the twenty years 
since Salerno”). In the last several years, however, there has been a much-needed resurgence of 
interest in these topics. See Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 16, at 420 (noting that “[r]ecently, 
a handful of scholars has rejuvenated the debate, focusing on the continuing problems of the 
pretrial system and the legal avenues for addressing them left open by Salerno.”); Appleman, 
supra note 5, at 1303 (“Although bail and detention was a popular scholarly topic a generation 
ago, only a few contemporary legal academics have scrutinized the current machinations of 
pretrial release.”). Even with this renewed interest, there has been too little focus on issues 
around judicial decision-making in this context. Cf. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 16, at 24 
(“[L]egal literature, too, has largely focused on the difficulties associated with predicting 
dangerousness generally, rather than on the decisionmaking [sic] process.”); id. at 43 (briefly 
asserting that “the risks of dangerousness and flight should be separately scored” but not 
elaborating on justifications for that separation). 
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some pretrial detention based on dangerousness, and outlining 
problems with current practices. Part I concludes by analyzing the 
evolution of pretrial risk measurement from judicial intuition and 
statutory risk factors to modern actuarial risk assessment tools. 
As outlined in Part II, flight risk must be measured and evaluated 
independently of dangerousness because federal and state laws 
governing pretrial detention and release frequently require separate 
consideration of these distinct risks. These legal requirements are the 
product of both (i) constitutional and statutory limitations on the 
circumstances in which pretrial detention may be ordered by a judge 
and (ii) constitutional and statutory provisions governing the 
imposition of bail or other conditions of release. 
Judges must also consider flight risk and dangerousness 
independently for several policy reasons that are outlined in Part III 
of the Article. First, combining the risks may cause judges to 
overestimate both kinds of risks. Second, forcing separate analyses of 
pretrial risks may provide judges with political cover, alleviating 
pressure to detain. In addition, isolating flight risk from danger may 
improve the feedback that judges receive about release decisions—
either through data about release outcomes or as embedded in 
validated risk assessment tools. Finally, courts have a range of readily 
available conditions of release that can be used to manage pretrial risks, 
but those conditions mitigate flight and danger in different ways and 
to varying degrees. 
I. DECONSTRUCTING PRETRIAL DECISION-MAKING 
For judges abiding by statutory requirements, the pretrial process 
turns out to be a blend of art, science, and will. Judges first evaluate 
factors deemed by the legislature to be relevant to flight risk and 
danger to gauge the pretrial riskiness of a particular defendant. As 
outlined in greater detail below, the risk assessment process is evolving 
from what has traditionally been loosely-guided intuitive judgment to 
something more scientific and data driven. State and federal statutes 
generally contain presumptions in favor of unrestricted release for 
defendants before trial, but if the risks are too high, judges must 
undertake a second statutory task: developing a plan for managing 
pretrial risks. There is a third crucial step: judges must have the will 
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(and perhaps the job security) to make release or detention decisions 
based on those calculations.22 
This Section makes clear that the current problem with bail and 
pretrial detention is a function of the confused mismanagement of 
flight risk and danger in contemporary pretrial practice. How did we 
get here? The following subsections briefly explain the history of the 
relationship between flight risk and bail, describe the evolution of 
preventive pretrial detention (i.e., pretrial detention to manage 
danger),23 and outline how these two pretrial risks—flight and 
danger—are currently mismanaged and mismeasured. 
A. Flight Risk and Bail: Historically 
The need to ensure a defendant’s appearance at trial has 
historically been the principal driver of judicial decisions around bail 
and pretrial detention.24 Judges have always been expected to make 
predictions of a defendant’s so-called “flight risk” or risk of 
nonappearance.25 Flight risk is properly assigned to defendants who 
are expected to flee a jurisdiction or to be difficult to locate.26 
 
 22. See infra Section IV.B for a more detailed discussion of how disentangling flight risk 
and dangerousness might address these political issues. 
 23. The expression “preventive detention” is used throughout the Article in the 
traditional sense to refer to detention that is intended to prevent future crimes. It does not 
include detention that might be intended to “prevent” flight. 
 24. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 n.3 (1951) (“If the defendant is admitted to bail, 
the amount thereof shall be such as in the judgment of the commissioner or court or judge or 
justice will insure [sic] the presence of the defendant . . . .”); see also Appleman, supra note 5, at 
1335 (“[A]lthough the specific intent of the Framers regarding bail cannot be conclusively 
determined, all the available evidence points to the fact that pretrial detention, both under the 
English common law and at the time the Constitution was written, was limited to flight risk.”); 
GOLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 16, at 51 (“[O]ne aim of [first generation] bail reform 
was to influence judges to restrict their motives or purposes in bail decisionmaking [sic] to the 
one viewed as legitimate—guaranteeing the defendant’s attendance at required proceedings.”). 
Before the Supreme Court’s 1987 decision in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), 
flight risk was the only legitimate (i.e., constitutional) basis for detaining a defendant before trial. 
Salerno is discussed in detail in Section I.B.3, infra. 
 25. These terms—flight risk and nonappearance—are too often used interchangeably in 
court decisions, in academic literature, and in risk assessment tools. As this author asserts in 
another work in progress, titled Defining Flight Risk, the terms are not truly interchangeable. 
That project builds on the arguments outlined here: if flight risk is isolated properly from danger, 
it is easier to undertake the task of defining precisely what flight risk means and how to manage 
it. Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk (forthcoming 2017).  
 26. This category of defendants who would be inclined to flee (and who might pose a risk 
of being successful doing so) is a small category of all non-appearing defendants. With advances 
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Judges traditionally managed flight risk by setting bail or imposing 
other conditions of release to secure defendants’ future appearance. 
Bail—the practice of requiring a defendant or his sureties to put up 
money or property to incentivize the defendant to return to court—
has a long pedigree in this country and in England before here.27 Aside 
from early English practices, where bail was sometimes set to 
approximate the debt that a defendant might owe to a victim at the 
resolution of a case,28 money bail has traditionally been justified as a 
means of discouraging flight by enticing released defendants back to 
court to recover their money or property.29 
In most states and under federal law, from 1789 to the 1960s, 
individuals who were arrested for noncapital offenses were entitled to 
bail.30 Indeed, this right, generally envisioned as essential to the 
presumption of innocence, was incorporated into many state 
constitutions.31 At the federal level, this right to bail was part of the 
 
in GPS monitoring and other technology, disappearing has become much more difficult, so this 
is also a shrinking subcategory of non-appearing defendants. See Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial 
Detention and the Right to be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1352–53 (2014) [hereinafter 
Wiseman, Detention] (“Recent, extensive changes in technology, such as the rise of Internet 
photos and enhanced police communication, have greatly decreased flight incentives, and 
technologies such as GPS monitoring also allow the police to easily monitor those individuals 
who still have an incentive to flee.”). The broader category of non-appearing defendants includes 
a range of more innocuous and preventable conduct that calls for different types and degrees of 
supervision and management. See Gouldin, supra note 25. 
 27. Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1352 (“Since the founding of this country, 
judges have required individuals to post some form of collateral in order to incentivize them to 
appear at a trial that they strongly wish to avoid—a process that could ultimately lead to their 
conviction and imprisonment.”) (citation omitted). 
 28. See TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR 
PRETRIAL PRACTITIONERS AND A FRAMEWORK FOR AMERICAN PRETRIAL REFORM 40 (2014). 
 29. Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1352. 
 30. See June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic 
Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 531–32 (1983) (explaining 
that Pennsylvania’s constitutional provision which provided a right to bail for all but capital 
offenses “became the model for almost every state constitution adopted after 1776”). 
 31. See id.; see also Baradaran, Innocence, supra note 21, at 727–28 (explaining that the 
presumption of innocence has historically operated in several ways: it “required a legal 
determination at trial to punish a defendant for a crime,” it was the foundation for the right to 
bail in noncapital cases, and “it did not allow judges to detain defendants because they were 
likely to commit a crime while released, or to weigh the evidence against defendants before trial, 
in deciding whether they should be released”); GOLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 16, at 
19–20 (describing historical criticism of “pretrial detention . . . as an affront to the notion of 
presumption of innocence”). 
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Judiciary Act of 1789.32 Although this right was not included in the 
United States Constitution, the Eighth Amendment does state that 
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.”33 The Supreme Court has given 
this clause very limited attention34 and, to date, the excessive bail 
provision has not provided significant protection for pretrial detainees.35 
In passing the 1966 Bail Reform Act, Congress significantly 
narrowed the federal right to bail by empowering courts, at least in 
certain cases, to deny bail and order defendants to be detained until 
trial.36 Until the 1980s, however, a federal judge could only legally 
order detention (i.e., deny bail) based on flight risk.37 
B. Legitimizing Detention for Dangerousness 
Notwithstanding this history, the one-dimensional task of 
predicting and managing flight risk has long been complicated by 
judicial and community concerns about a second, separate risk: the 
danger that a defendant released before trial poses to public safety.38 
As outlined below, dangerousness eventually came to be viewed by 
 
 32. The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 STAT. 73. Until 1966, this right to bail was also part of 
Rule 46(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (drafted in 1944). FED. R. CRIM. P. 
46(a)(1) (1944). 
 33. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 34. Wiseman, Discrimination, supra note 21, at 123. (“There has been relatively little 
innovation in the law and scholarship on bail since Salerno . . . .”); see also United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752-54 (1987) (citing only two previous cases where the Supreme Court 
addressed the Excessive Bail Clause (Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 72 (1952) and Stack v. 
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951)). 
 35. Samuel R. Wiseman makes a very compelling case that detention of non-dangerous 
defendants is almost always “excessive” as a means of managing flight risk given the ready availability 
of cheap and effective electronic monitoring. Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1392. 
 36. The 1966 Bail Reform Act included a presumption in favor of release, but if the court 
could not devise conditions of release that would assure the defendant’s appearance at trial, the 
court could order a defendant to be detained. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146–3152 (2012). 
 37. Id. (listing only “the appearance of the person” as a relevant pretrial concern for 
judges). As other scholars have noted, however, the legislative history for the 1966 Act makes 
clear that at least some legislators acknowledged that preventive pretrial detention might be 
justifiable in the future. Thomas E. Scott, Pretrial Detention Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984: 
An Empirical Analysis, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 89-1541 
(1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2293, 2296). More detail about current bail practices 
is provided in Sections I.C.3–5, infra. 
 38. This Article principally uses the term “dangerousness” both because it is easy 
shorthand and because it is a more precise descriptor (than the vague “public safety risk” or 
some broader risk of reoffending) of the type of risk that most justifies pretrial detention. 
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state and federal legislatures, and by the Supreme Court, as a 
legitimate basis for pretrial detention in some cases. This subpart 
briefly recounts the evolution of that doctrine. 
1. Pretextual preventive detention 
Even before dangerousness was deemed a legitimate basis for 
pretrial detention, judges made decisions about pretrial release and 
bail with an eye toward the perceived dangerousness of the defendants 
standing before them. Prior to the adoption of the modern state and 
federal statutes that explicitly permit some consideration of public 
safety risks, it was widely acknowledged that judges deliberately set 
unaffordable bail amounts on pretextual flight risk grounds so that 
dangerous individuals would be detained until trial.39 
Beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, Congress and most state 
legislatures, amended or rewrote bail statutes to adapt to what had 
been happening at bail hearings for decades. The federal statute, most 
state statutes, and most state constitutions now permit some detention 
for dangerousness.40 These legislative changes clearly responded to the 
public’s increasing fears of criminal activity and, specifically, to reports 
of high rates of recidivism among those on pretrial release.41 On the 
one hand, then, these changes were clearly intended to lead to some 
increase in preventive pretrial detention.42 
According to some reformers, however, the goal was not 
necessarily to increase pretrial detention, but to regulate what judges 
were already doing. In their view, the new state and federal legislation 
 
 39. Clara Kalhous & John Meringolo, Bail Pending Trial: Changing Interpretations of the 
Bail Reform Act and the Importance of Bail from Defense Attorneys’ Perspectives, 32 PACE L. REV. 
800, 813 (2012) (explaining that between 1966 and 1984, “federal courts were taking matters 
into their own hands, effectively denying bail in cases where they deemed defendants to be 
dangerous by setting inordinately high bail, albeit on stated grounds of risk of flight.”); 
Goldkamp & Vîlcicã, supra note 16, at 128 (describing the historical problem of the “sub rosa 
use of preventive detention through cash bail”). 
 40. See infra Sections III.B.1–2, which review these provisions in more detail; see also 
GOLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 16, at 23 (lamenting that second generation bail 
reform had “modified itself to accommodate preventive detention as a legitimate bail function”). 
 41. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 3, 6 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3185, 
3189 (asserting that reform was necessary to “address the alarming problem of crimes 
committed by persons on release” and to empower courts “to make release decisions” based on 
“the danger a person may pose to others if released”); see also Scott, supra note 37, at 6 
(describing the studies). 
 42. See Scott, supra note 37, at 6. 
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simply made explicit considerations of dangerousness that had long 
animated judicial decision-making around bail and pretrial 
detention.43 There was some expectation that allowing judges to be 
transparent about their assessment of defendants’ dangerousness 
would discourage judges from using flight risk as a pretext for danger-
based detention decisions. As described by some legislators, the 
changes introduced to the federal statute were expected to make bail 
decisions more “honest[]” and protect the integrity of the process.44 
The following subsection examines the specific statutory changes 
that introduced dangerousness as a pretrial consideration in some 
federal cases. These provisions were later upheld by the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Salerno.45 
2. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 
By permitting federal judges to rely explicitly on the 
dangerousness of a defendant in making certain pretrial decisions, the 
federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 followed the lead of a number of 
similar state statutes.46 The Act expressly states that the terms of a 
 
 43. See id. at 6–7; Michael Harwin, Detaining for Danger Under the Bail Reform Act of 
1984: Paradoxes of Procedure and Proof, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 1091, 1093–94 (1993). 
 44. Daniel Richman, The Story of United States v. Salerno: The Constitutionality of 
Regulatory Detention, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT LEADING 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES 413, 419 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (explaining that part of the 
rationale for the Bail Reform Act was a desire to bring the statute in line with judicial practices); 
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 11 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3194 (explaining that 
permitting detention for dangerousness “would allow the courts to address the issue of pretrial 
criminality honestly and effectively”). 
 45. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
 46. The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Act of 1970 was one of the 
first statutes that allowed judges to order defendants detained before trial based on concerns 
about public safety. District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, 
PUB. L. NO. 91-358, 84 STAT. 473, 642–43 (1970) (requiring the release of a defendant “unless 
the officer determines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not reasonably 
assure the appearance of the person as required or the safety of any other person or the 
community”); Scott, supra note 37, at 4–5. This preventive detention feature of the act was 
attacked in a series of cases, but was ultimately held constitutional. See United States v. Edwards, 
430 A.2d 1321, 1342–43 (D.C. 1981) (en banc); De Veau v. United States, 454 A.2d 1308 
(D.C. 1982) (same), abrogated by Lynch v. United States, 557 A.2d 580, 581 (D.C. 1989) (en 
banc). Thirty-four states passed statutes similar to the District of Columbia’s before 1984. See 
Appleman, supra note 5, at 1330. For a detailed description of modern state statutes’ approaches 
to factoring dangerousness into pretrial decision-making, see Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 
19, at 506–13. 
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defendant’s pretrial release turn on a judicial officer’s assessment of 
both flight risk and dangerousness. The statute begins with a direction 
to the judge that she 
shall order the pretrial release of a person on personal recognizance, 
or upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond . . . unless the 
judicial officer determines that such release will not reasonably assure 
the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of 
any other person or the community.47 
The italicized text illustrates the pairing of the two risks; they are 
similarly conjoined in multiple other places in the statute. 
If the judge believes that a defendant is too great a flight or public 
safety risk, she may impose conditions of release on the defendant in 
order to mitigate those risks.48 The statute is clear that judges must 
choose “the least restrictive further condition, or combination of 
conditions, that such judicial officer determines will reasonably assure 
the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other 
person and the community,”49 but the interplay between flight risk and 
danger and the connection between these risks and the conditions the 
judge may impose are not well- articulated.50 
The most significant and controversial change in the 1984 Act 
related to its detention provisions. For defendants charged with 
certain specified categories of very serious offenses, if there were not 
conditions of release that could effectively mitigate those defendants’ 
dangerousness, judges could order detention.51 In fact, the Act created 
a rebuttable presumption in favor of preventive detention for 
defendants arrested for certain more serious offenses and defendants 
with certain types of prior convictions.52 
Although the risk of dangerousness is not clearly defined in the 
Bail Reform Act, courts have construed it broadly—in part, at the 
 
 47. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 48. Id. § 3142(c). 
 49. Id. § 3142(c)(1)(B). Many state statutes contain similar language. See Wiseman, 
Detention, supra note 26, at 1395 n.229 (collecting statutes). 
 50. For further discussion, see infra Section III.D. 
 51. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d)(2) (“If the judicial officer determines that [a defendant] may 
flee or pose a danger to any other person or the community, such judicial officer shall order the 
detention of such person.”). 
 52. Id. § 3142(e)(2)–(3). These detention provisions and procedures are examined more 
closely in Section II.B, infra. 
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direction of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. In passing the 
1984 Act, the Committee provided an example of what it viewed as 
“dangerousness”: “[T]he risk that a defendant will continue to engage 
in drug trafficking constitutes a danger to the ‘safety of any other 
person or the community.’”53 As a result, at least under some 
interpretations of the federal statute, defendants can be deemed 
“public safety risks” if they pose a risk of committing any crime on 
release; the label is not limited to those who may commit violent or 
dangerous crimes.54 
3. United States v. Salerno 
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of some 
preventive pretrial detention in its 1987 decision United States v. 
Salerno.55 The Salerno Court upheld the Bail Reform Act, against a 
facial challenge, on the ground that these provisions were 
“regulatory,” and that they furthered the government’s legitimate 
interest in the safety of the community.56 
It is worth emphasizing that Salerno does not provide a blanket 
authorization for preventive pretrial detention.57 The Salerno holding 
expressly rested on the limits of the statute.58 In the Court’s view, the 
liberty interests implicated by pretrial detention were sufficiently 
protected by “Congress’ careful delineation of the circumstances 
 
 53. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 13 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3196; see 
Kalhous & Meringolo, supra note 39, at 806–07; see also Wiseman, Discrimination, supra note 
21, at 143 (collecting federal cases that broadly construe “danger” under the Bail Reform Act). 
 54. Wiseman, Discrimination, supra note 21, at 143 (citing to cases that broadly interpret 
“danger” under the Bail Reform Act); cf. Appleman, supra note 5, at 1339 (criticizing the 
“imprecision of [this] terminology” in the Bail Reform Act). One appealing feature of the newest 
pretrial risk assessment tool on the market is that it differentiates between this sort of broad 
public safety risk and the narrower, more concerning, and more difficult to manage risk of 
violence. See Section I.D.3, infra, for more discussion of the PSA-Court assessment tool. 
 55. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
 56. Id. at 746–49; see also id. at 747 (“[T]he punitive/regulatory distinction turns on 
‘whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is 
assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned 
[to it].” (second and third alterations in original) (citation omitted)). 
 57. See Sandra Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, at 7 (on file with author) (explaining that 
Salerno “held that neither substantive due process, procedural due process, nor the Excessive 
Bail Clause categorically prohibits preventive detention”). 
 58. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755 (“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention . . . 
without trial is the carefully limited exception.”). 
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under which detention [is] permitted.”59 As the Court explained, 
“[t]he Act operates only on individuals who have been arrested for a 
specific category of extremely serious offenses” and it rests on specific 
legislative findings that “individuals [arrested for those crimes] are far 
more likely to be responsible for dangerous acts in the community 
after arrest.”60 
The Court also identified several other safeguards to a defendant’s 
liberty interests: to detain a defendant, the Act requires probable cause 
that the defendant committed the crime, and it states that the 
government must prove its case to detain for dangerousness by clear 
and convincing evidence that the individual poses a risk to public 
safety.61 In addition, the Court cited the fact that the Act requires the 
judicial officer to make written findings of fact and a statement of 
reasons to detain and grants immediate appellate review.62 
C. Mismanaging Flight and Danger 
Once judges evaluate the risks posed by a particular defendant, 
they have tiers of risk-management options they can employ. As 
outlined briefly below, mismanagement of flight risk and 
dangerousness occurs at every step, whether defendants are released 
or detained. The following subsections detail some of the specific ways 
judges mismanage pretrial risks, including: releasing too few 
defendants on their own recognizance; imposing excessive and 
counterproductive nonfinancial conditions on defendants who are 
released; imposing overly burdensome financial conditions on 
defendants who are released; detaining too many low-risk individuals 
who are simply too poor to afford their bail; and, relatedly, using 
unaffordable money bail pretextually to ensure the detention of 
defendants perceived as dangerous. 
 
 59. Id. at 751. The Salerno Court’s view of the meaning of “excessiveness”—and its 
relationship to the purposes articulated by the government—is examined in more detail in 
Section II.A, infra. 
 60. Id. at 750. 
 61. Id. at 751–52. 
 62. Id. at 752. 
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1. Neglect of release on recognizance 
Defendants who pose low risks of flight and danger should be 
released on their own recognizance (i.e., without any court-imposed 
restrictions).63 It is essential to present this as the first inquiry—as 
many statutes do—because release protects the presumption of 
innocence.64 Most statutes are structured in this way to preserve the 
idea that ordering pretrial detention is a last resort. 
Over the last several decades there has been a significant reduction 
in the number of defendants who are released on recognizance.65 That 
drop is explained by increases in the imposition of bail and other 
conditions of release and in pretrial detention, both of which are 
examined more closely in the following subsections. 
2. Counterproductive use of nonfinancial conditions of release 
Defendants who pose risks of flight and/or danger that make 
them too risky to be released on recognizance may still be released 
with a range of possible conditions imposed on them.66 Unfortunately, 
however, statutes give judges almost no direction about which 
conditions of release effectively manage which kinds of risk.67 
So-called “bail” statutes include a number of nonfinancial 
conditions of release (examined in this Section) that can be imposed 
in lieu of or in addition to bail or bonds (examined in the next 
Section). Typical nonfinancial conditions include requiring a 
defendant to: remain in the custody of a third party; seek or maintain 
employment or education; refrain from associating with particular 
 
 63. See SCHNACKE, supra note 28, at 10–17 (explaining that this is not a zero                      
risk requirement). 
 64. Cf. Baradaran, Innocence, supra note 21, at 730–31 (elaborating on historical 
recognition of the link between general right to bail and fundamental presumption of 
innocence); Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 16, at 426 (“Despite legislative treatment of 
pretrial release as a default, and requirements that judges make certain findings when departing 
from the default, pretrial detention rates are high and have risen steadily . . . .”). 
 65. SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 3, at 29 (explaining that in the two decades from 1990 to 
2009, the ROR rate dropped significantly; “in 2009 (the latest year for which data are available), 
those released on their own recognizance (also referred to as ROR) made up only 23 percent of 
all felony defendants released pretrial”). 
 66. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2012). These conditions of release are examined 
in more detail in Section IV.D, infra. 
 67. See infra Section IV.D. 
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people; abide by restrictions on travel and housing; comply with 
curfews or restrictions on living arrangements; refrain from excessive 
alcohol use; avoid all drug use; not possess weapons; report regularly 
to supervising authorities; and undergo medical, psychiatric and/or 
substance abuse treatment.68 Judges are not limited to these 
conditions; most statutes permit them to craft other appropriate 
conditions of release.69 
Studies raise real questions about how well judges tailor conditions 
of release to the risks they identify. Although unaffordable bail and 
overuse of pretrial detention get more attention from scholars and 
reformers,70 there are also reasons to be concerned about overloading 
defendants with expensive and counterproductive conditions of 
release. As Marie VanNostrand has explained: 
Despite the appealing logic of involving low‐risk individuals in 
intensive programming to prevent them from graduating to more 
serious behavior, numerous studies show that certain programs may 
actually worsen their outcomes.71 
In a recent article analyzing probation conditions, Fiona Doherty 
explains why this might be: “[T]he expectations set by many standard 
conditions fall differently on those who are poor and least able to make 
their experiences visible.”72 Doherty describes in detail how some 
standard conditions operate differently on poor defendants: 
 
 68. 18 U.S.C § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2012) (identifying conditions which may be imposed by 
the court to assure defendant’s appearance at trial and the safety of the community). 
 69. See, e.g., id. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv) (stating the court may require the defendant to 
“satisfy any other condition that is reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the person 
as required and to assure the safety of any other person and the community.”). 
 70. Cf. Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of 
Recidivism, 104 GEO. L.J. 291, 344 (2016) (explaining that probation gets too little scrutiny 
from scholars who focus instead on incarceration because of probation’s “outdated reputation 
as a progressive alternative to incarceration”); see also id. (“[T]he hope that probation might 
solve the problems of mass incarceration has led policymakers to glide over the problems created 
by probation itself.”). 
 71. See Marie VanNostrand, Presentation at the California Realignment Conference: 
Using Evidence to Advance Effective Justice Realignment Pretrial 5 (Sept. 21, 2011), 
http://libcloud.s3.amazonaws.com/211/7e/f/247/panel_1.1_vannostrand_impacting_pretr
ial_jail_populations_092111_2.pdf. 
 72. Doherty, supra note 70, at 345; see also id. at 349 (observing that “people are poor 
because of long-standing factors like educational background, family circumstances, and lack of 
stable work history”). 
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The requirement to report as directed, for example, can be 
disproportionately difficult for poor people, as can the requirement 
to attend fixed treatment appointments. People with low paying jobs 
are less likely to have flexibility in their work schedules. Missing work 
makes them at risk of losing their jobs. They lose money if they lose 
work hours. If they have children, they may struggle to pay for a 
babysitter. For the poorest probationers, of whom there are many, 
finding reliable and affordable transportation to the probation office 
or to a treatment program can be an insurmountable hurdle.73 
Doherty also notes that, in contrast to defendants with more 
resources, poor defendants will have less power to object to the 
manner in which their compliance with these conditions is enforced.74 
These probation-focused arguments have equal purchase for poor 
defendants facing similar conditions of pretrial release. 
In some cases, judges craft alternative conditions of release that 
are difficult to justify in terms of managing either flight risk or 
dangerousness. In a 2012 op-ed, Dan Markel and Eric Miller 
highlighted some particularly egregious examples, including cases 
where judges ordered defendants on pretrial release to write book 
reports or to take a spouse bowling.75 In addition to violating Salerno’s 
definition of “excessiveness” and inviting obvious policy objections, 
imposing unnecessary supervision obligations or other conditions 
violates most bail statutes, which direct judges to utilize the least 
restrictive condition or combination of conditions of release that will 
prevent flight and protect public safety.76 
3. Overreliance on money bail to secure release 
The conditions most often used are financial conditions of release, 
which are often referred to as different forms of “money bail.”77 
Money bail is particularly problematic because it frequently leads to 
 
 73. Id. at 350. 
 74. Id. at 345. 
 75. Dan Markel & Eric J. Miller, Opinion, Bowling, as Bail Condition, N.Y. TIMES (July 
13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/14/opinion/not-yet-tried-but-sentenced-to-
red-lobster.html?_r=0. 
 76. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2012). 
 77. Timothy R. Schnacke, former Executive Director of the Pretrial Justice Institute has 
written in some detail about the history of the term “bail” and the problems with our modern 
association of the term “bail” with money. See SCHNACKE, supra note 28, at 21–35. 
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detention instead of securing release. The detention-related critiques 
of money bail are outlined in the subsections that follow. As outlined 
here, even for defendants who are able to pay for their release, the type 
and/or amount of bail imposed can be excessive. 
Money bail can take a range of different forms. Sometimes courts 
impose unsecured appearance bonds, where a defendant is released 
without any up-front payment but agrees to pay a set amount of 
money if he or she fails to show up for court.78 If a friend or family 
member makes this promise it is called an unsecured surety bond.79 
These underutilized conditions impose financial penalties for failing 
to return to court but do not require prepayment for release. More 
frequently, however, courts impose more traditional forms of money 
bail: requiring defendants to pay some money upfront or to find a 
third party (surety) to do so.80 
Even for defendants who are able to make bail and are released 
pretrial, there are important problems with the system. There is a 
dearth of evidence that money bail is an effective or necessary financial 
 
 78. The definitions supplied here and in note 80, infra, are drawn from Schnacke’s helpful 
article, see id., and from a summary and chart created by the Justice Policy Institute that 
illustrates the range of possible financial conditions that may be imposed. See JUSTICE POLICY 
INSTITUTE, BAIL FAIL: WHY THE U.S. SHOULD END THE PRACTICE OF USING MONEY FOR 
BAIL 7–9 (Sept. 2012). 
 79. Baradaran, Innocence, supra note 21, at 733 (explaining the perceived role of the 
surety as a guarantor of the defendant’s presence: “Because the defendant, presumably, would 
not want to punish his sureties he would not flee, and because the sureties would not want to 
pay a fine, they would make sure the defendant appeared in court.”). 
 80. These arrangements can take a number of different forms that are given different 
names. For shorthand in this Article and to contrast them to the far less problematic unsecured 
bond conditions just discussed, I refer to these prepaid bail arrangements as “money bail.” 
Sometimes defendants will be released if they post a partially secured appearance or surety bond 
(this is also called a deposit bond), which means that they post a percentage of the total bail 
amount (often ten percent) and agree to pay the remainder if they fail to appear. Defendants 
may also be released if they post a commercial bond and the bail bondsman posts the full amount 
to the court. See SCHNACKE, supra note 28, at 2–3. Some defendants will be required to post 
the entire amount in cash; some will be permitted to use credit cards; others may post 
collateral (by providing the deed or title to a house or car or other property, for example). 
The use of these different forms of bail and bonds will vary according to the jurisdiction and 
by judge. See id. at 3–4. 
Bail or bond amounts that are posted to the court are typically refunded when the defendant 
appears as required. (There may, however, be court fees that are imposed as part of these 
transactions.) A defendant who uses a commercial bail bondsman typically pays at least ten 
percent of the total bail amount as a nonrefundable fee to the bondsman. 
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incentive, particularly given the alternatives that are available.81 To 
justify money bail, studies would need to demonstrate that bail is a 
more effective financial incentive than the unsecured bond provisions 
described above (or than other non-financial alternatives). None have 
done so.82 
Defendants who are able to somehow raise money for their bail 
may face excessive financial hardships. Because bail is generally not 
calibrated based on a defendant’s ability to pay, “indigent defendants 
and their families” who are able to scrape together the funds for 
release may be forced “to spend money that otherwise would have 
covered basic necessities.”83 Additionally, in many cases where 
defendants are able to gather the resources for their bail, judges use 
this to challenge their eligibility for court-appointed counsel.84 In 
other cases where defendants’ incomes exceed those thresholds, 
using financial resources to pay bail means having fewer resources to 
devote to their legal defense. 
4. Detention for poverty 
The preceding subsections addressed problems relating to 
defendants who are released. Of course, not all defendants are released 
before trial. There are two principal means by which defendants wind 
 
 81. There is surprisingly no real data that suggests that money bail is an effective flight 
risk management tool. See SCHNACKE, supra note 28, at 10–17. 
 82. Id. at 91–92. 
 83. Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1360. 
 84. States generally fall into one of three categories for how they consider defendants’ 
ability to post bond in determining indigency: (1) ability to post bond creates a rebuttable 
presumption of nonindigency, (2) ability to post bond is a factor in determining indigency, (3) 
ability to post bond is not a consideration in determining indigency. Allison D. Kuhns, If You 
Cannot Afford an Attorney, Will One Be Appointed for You?: How (Some) States Force Criminal 
Defendants To Choose Between Posting Bond and Getting a Court-Appointed Attorney, 97 IOWA 
L. REV. 1787, 1799–1800 (2012). “[E]ven in states that appear to have a multifactor test, a 
defendant’s posting of bond is frequently abused in the indigency determination.” Id. at 1804. 
Additionally, “there is evidence that even in [states where a defendant’s ability to post bond is 
not a factor in determining his or her indigency] some courts use bond posting as a factor in 
determining indigency.” Id. at 1805. The practice of challenging defendants’ eligibility for court-
appointed counsel based on their ability to post bail runs counter to ABA guidance. N.Y. STATE 
OFFICE OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVS., CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING 
ASSIGNED COUNSEL ELIGIBILITY 25 (2016) (“The American Bar Association (ABA) has stated 
strongly and succinctly that ‘[c]ounsel should not be denied . . . because bond has been or can 
be posted.’” (quoting another source)). 
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up being detained before trial: (1) a judge may deny bail and order 
the defendant to be detained until trial (also known as remanding the 
defendant to custody) or (2) a judge may set bail at a sum that the 
defendant cannot pay.85 
First, depending on the jurisdiction’s pretrial detention statute, 
the judge may deny bail and order detention based on (i) the risk that 
the person will not appear for trial (“flight risk”) or, in some cases, (ii) 
the person’s risk to public safety (“dangerousness”). Federal and most 
state statutes are generally phrased to authorize detention if a judge 
finds that there are no conditions of release that can mitigate these 
risks.86 According to the Vera Institute of Justice, this direct route is 
the path to pretrial detention for only about one out of every ten 
pretrial detainees in state and local jails.87 
The other nine out of ten pretrial detainees identified in the Vera 
report follow a second, more indirect path to pretrial detention.88 If a 
judge does not order a defendant to be remanded, the judge may 
impose conditions of release (including financial conditions, like bail).89 
If a defendant is unable to satisfy those conditions—most frequently, if 
a defendant cannot afford her bail—she will be detained.90 
 
 85. Defendants may also end up in custody if they fail to abide by other conditions of release. 
 86. As explained in more detail in Sections II.A and II.B, “dangerousness” is only a 
permissible basis for ordering detention in certain types of cases. For certain categories of 
offenses, federal and state statutes create presumptions of dangerousness. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142 
(e)(2)–(3), (f)(1) (2012); see also infra notes 166–186 and accompanying text for more detailed 
discussion. For similar state provisions, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-533(d), (e) (2015); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 19.2-120(B), (C) (West 2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1101(D) (2011). 
 87. See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 32. 
 88. Id. (citing Brian A. Reaves, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2009 -
Statistical Tables, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE  (Dec. 2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf) (“[Thirty-eight] percent of felony defendants will spend the entirety of 
their pretrial periods in jail[,]” but within that population, “only one in ten of these defendants 
is detained because he or she is denied bail. The rest simply cannot afford the bail amount the 
judge sets”). 
 89. See supra Section I.C.3. 
 90. Simonson, supra note 9, at 3 (explaining that bail for indigent defendants is “the 
ballgame”; if they cannot afford bail, defendants suffer myriad costs of pretrial detention). 
Practitioners also report cases of defendants whose families might be able to pay bail but elect 
not to do so because judges warn (or threaten) that it will jeopardize their access to court-
appointed counsel. See Alec Karakatsanis, Policing, Mass Imprisonment, and the Failure of 
American Lawyers, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 253, 264 (2015) (“On recent trips to Tennessee, 
Alabama, and Missouri, for example, . . . I saw judges routinely inform jailed defendants that 
they would refuse to give them a court-appointed lawyer if their families were able to pay a bond 
to have them released from jail.”). 
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Judicial motives for setting unaffordable bail are not always clear 
and that opacity is increased when flight risk and dangerousness are 
considered together. There are, however, several possible motives. The 
first explanation, which some courts have accepted as reasonable, is that 
judges have simply set a price for flight risk. In theory, if we consider 
bail in isolation from other conditions of release, when a judge 
determines that a defendant’s flight risk mandates a particular bail figure 
and the defendant cannot afford that price, detention is warranted.91 In 
practice, however, money bail is not an isolated or singular option. 
Judges have a range of additional conditions of release they may impose 
instead of money bail or in addition to more modest or affordable 
money bail amounts to try to manage flight risk. Given these other 
options, judges’ overreliance on monetary bail is legally indefensible.92 
There are other possible explanations. Unaffordable bail may also 
result from judges’ blind reliance on bail schedules that set bail 
amounts according to offenses and do not adjust based on defendants’ 
resources. It may also be the product of neglect, ignorance, or 
overtaxed judges. These explanations do not, of course, resolve the 
underlying constitutional and statutory problems. 
The negative outcomes for defendants who are jailed before trial 
go well beyond the custody itself.93 For those detained, even short jail 
stays jeopardize employment or housing and can create risks that 
parents will lose custody of their children.94 Pretrial detention alters 
 
 91. See Michael S. Woodruff, Note, The Excessive Bail Clause: Achieving Pretrial Justice 
Reform Through Incorporation, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 241, 244 (2013) (explaining that courts 
have held that unaffordable bail is not necessarily “excessive,” so long as the figure set can be 
justified by the risk of flight) (collecting federal circuit cases); see also Wiseman, Discrimination, 
supra note 21, at 140, 140 n.104 (explaining that although courts are not required to “set bail 
at an amount that defendants can actually afford,” at least two circuits “have held that if the 
defendant protests that the trial court has set bail higher than he can pay, the trial court must 
provide a reasoned explanation for its arrival at the disputed figure”) (collecting cases). 
 92. The constitutional and statutory arguments are outlined in detail in Part II, infra. 
 93. The nature of the jail experience should not be minimized, of course. Jails are known 
to be less well-regulated, higher-risk facilities than prisons. See Appleman, supra note 5, at 1302 
(describing the country’s “rotting jail cells of impoverished defendants—still innocent before 
proven guilty” as “the Shadowlands of Justice”); see also David Gorlin, Note, Evaluating 
Punishment in Purgatory: The Need to Separate Pretrial Detainees’ Conditions-of-Confinement 
Claims from Inadequate Eighth Amendment Analysis, 108 MICH. L. REV. 417, 419 (2009). 
 94. See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 18, 22. 
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legal outcomes for defendants in troubling ways, too.95 Those who are 
detained before trial are more likely to be convicted and to serve 
longer sentences than defendants with comparable risk levels who are 
released before trial.96 Not surprisingly, pretrial detainees—even those 
who claim innocence—feel heightened pressure to plead guilty.97 
Money bail’s practical role as a path to detention for the poor is 
well documented and it is not a twenty-first century revelation. When 
President Lyndon Johnson signed the first Bail Reform Act into law 
in 1966, he was optimistic that the statute would fix a money bail 
system that he described as “archaic and cruel.”98 Johnson 
 
 95. See Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1353–58 (describing the burdens of pretrial 
detention in detail). 
 96. ARNOLD FOUND., DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MODEL FOR PRETRIAL RISK 
ASSESSMENT 5 (2013), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/ 02/LJAF-research-summary_PSA-Court_4_1.pdf [hereinafter 
ARNOLD FOUND., RESEARCH SUMMARY]; see also SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 14 
(“While results varied by length of detention and risk level, in virtually every category, those 
detained were more likely to be rearrested before trial, to receive a sentence of imprisonment, 
to be given a longer term of imprisonment, and to recidivate after sentence completion.”). 
 97. See Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson, and Megan Stevenson, The Downstream 
Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); Will 
Dobbie, Jacob Goldin, Crystal Yang, The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on Conviction, Future 
Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, NBER Working Paper No. 
22511 (August 2016); Mary T. Phillips, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., A DECADE 
OF BAIL RESEARCH IN NEW YORK CITY 115 (2012), http://issuu.com/
csdesignworks/docs/decadebailresearch12?e=2550004/5775378 (“The pressure on a jailed 
defendant to plead guilty seems a particularly compelling explanation for how detention could 
lead to a greater likelihood of conviction. A defendant who is facing a non-custodial sentence 
can be released immediately by pleading guilty, whereas holding out for acquittal may mean 
spending many more days, weeks, or months behind bars. Moreover, prosecutors may be less 
willing to offer postarraignment plea bargains when they already have the leverage of detention 
to encourage a guilty plea—resulting in conviction to more severe charges merely because the 
defendant could not make bail.”); VERA INST. OF JUST., LOS ANGELES COUNTY JAIL 
OVERCROWDING REDUCTION PROJECT 10 (2011), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/
resources/downloads/LA_County_Jail_Overcrowding_Reduction_Report.pdf (“[S]ome . . . 
[in law enforcement] acknowledged that defendants in custody have a greater incentive to plead 
than those who are released pretrial, and that this pressure may serve the purpose of settling 
cases more quickly.”); see also Karakatsanis, supra note 90, at 264 (describing watching 
“hundreds of defendants in minor misdemeanor cases plead guilty without a lawyer just so that 
they could finally get out of jail after weeks in custody because they were too poor to pay for 
their release pending trial”). 
 98. Foster, supra note 2 (describing Johnson’s speech); see also Robert Young, Bail 
Reform Act is Signed by President, CHI. TRIB. 2 (June 23, 1966), 
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1966/06/23/page/30/article/bail-reform-act-is-signe
d-by-president. 
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acknowledged that “[b]ecause of the bail system, the scales of justice 
[were] weighted not with fact nor law nor mercy. They [were] 
weighted with money.”99 
Legislatures, other government officials, and courts across the 
country have begun to recognize the patent unfairness of detaining 
defendants who cannot afford to pay bail.100 In a series of class action 
lawsuits filed over the last year, Equal Justice Under Law, a Washington, 
D.C., nonprofit legal services organization, has begun to challenge 
money bail systems that do not take account of a defendant’s ability to 
pay.101 As noted supra, the Department of Justice filed a Statement of 
Interest in the first such suit in federal court, which challenged money 
bail schedules used in Clanton, Alabama.102 The Statement of Interest 
emphasized that, in addition to violating the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, when bail is set at an amount that does 
not “account for a defendant’s indigency,” it stops fulfilling the “central 
rationales underlying pretrial detention.”103 In accepting the parties’ 
settlement agreement, the Alabama district court declared that the use 
of a secured (money) bail to detain an individual following arrest 
“without an individualized hearing regarding the person’s indigence 
and the need for bail or alternatives to bail, violates the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”104 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. See infra Section II.B.2 for details about legislative and constitutional changes to end 
the use of money bail in New Jersey and similar legislative proposals in other states. 
 101. Equal Justice Under Law, Ending the American Money Bail System, 
http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/current-cases/ending-the-american-money-bail-system/ 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2015); see also E-mails from Equal Justice Under Law (Oct. 30, 2015, 
11:57 PM), (Oct. 22, 2015, 9:10 PM) (on file with author). Equal Justice Under Law has filed 
similar suits in six other states (California, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Missouri), 
alleging that individual money bail and pretrial detention systems are unconstitutional. See 
Complaint at 2, 10–11, Martinez v. City of Dodge City, No. 15-cv-09344 (D. Kan. Oct. 21, 
2015) (alleging that Dodge City, Kansas routinely “refuse[s] to release arrestees from jail unless 
they pay a generic and arbitrary ‘bond’ amount”). 
 102. See DOJ Statement of Interest, supra note 7, at 1 (announcing that “[i]ncarcerating 
individuals solely because of their inability to pay for their release, whether through the payment of 
fines, fees, or a cash bond, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 103. Id. at 10–11. 
 104. Jones v. City of Clanton, No. 15cv34-MHT, 2015 WL 5387219, at *2 (M.D. Ala. 
Sept. 14, 2015). 
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Equal Justice Under Law was similarly successful in a challenge to 
the use of fixed bail schedules in Velda, Missouri.105 In June 2015, the 
Missouri district court issued an injunction preventing the city from 
using secured money bail in any case, and a declaratory judgment 
stating that the Equal Protection Clause is violated when an individual 
is detained after an arrest because that person cannot afford to post a 
monetary bond.106 Equal Justice Under the Law was again successful in 
November 2015, when the Southern District of Mississippi declared it 
unconstitutional for an individual to be held in custody after an arrest 
because the person is too poor to post monetary bond.107 The 
organization also filed a similar lawsuit challenging the money bail 
practices of Harris County, Texas, where approximately 6,500 people 
(80% of the county jail population) are incarcerated because they cannot 
afford to make bail.108 These legal successes have driven important 
reforms to reduce judges’ default reliance on money bail and to end the 
sort of wealth-based detention highlighted by the lawsuits. 
5. Misuse of money bail: Pretextual preventive detention 
It is important, however, to resist the temptation to oversimplify 
the problem of unaffordable bail as merely one of finances. Although 
it is clear that in some cases judges inadvertently set excessive bail, it 
is also well-understood that, in other cases, judges continue to set 
unpayable bail figures to manage perceived public safety risks.109 In a 
 
 105. See Class Action Complaint at 1, Pierce v. Velda, No. 15-cv-00570 (E.D. Mo. 
Apr. 2, 2015). 
 106. Order at 1, Pierce v. Velda, No. 15-cv-00570 (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2015). 
 107. See Thompson v. Moss Point, No. 1:15cv182LG-RHW, 2015 WL 10322003 (S.D. 
Miss. Nov. 6, 2015). 
 108. Eesha Pandit, Criminal injustice in Texas: Thousands stay jailed in just one county 
because they can’t pay bail—and it’s happening all over the U.S., SALON (June 5, 2016), 
http://www.salon.com/2016/06/05/criminal_injustice_in_texas_thousands_stay_jailed_in_j
ust_one_county_because_they_cant_pay_bail_and_its_happening_all_over_the_u_s/. The 
plaintiffs in the Harris County case are three individuals arrested for misdemeanor offenses who 
were incarcerated after they could not afford their bail amounts. Id. This includes one pregnant 
mother who was arrested and detained for failing to show proper identification. Lise Olsen, 
Lawsuit adds pregnant mom who was jailed five days after traffic stop, HOUS. CHRON. (May 24, 
2016), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/houston/article/Lawsuit-adds-pregnant-mom-
detained-five-days-7942253.php?t=d1d8c5d1f1438d9cbb&cmpid=email-premium. 
 109. Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1346 n.2 (explaining that “in some cases[,] 
this reflects a judgment [in the form of high bail setting] that the defendants are dangerous, but 
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recent article, the New York Times quoted one Baltimore judge who 
was “presented with abundant evidence” that a defendant had been 
involved with protests.110 She explained that the defendant was “out 
of control and . . . a threat to public safety.”111 She set his bail at 
$500,000 because “there is no way that I can guarantee public safety, 
should he make bail.”112 Another judge stated it plainly: “The bail is 
really being set to keep the person in custody. You have to kind of 
concede that.”113 
This is the point in the pretrial detention system that seems to 
operate most illogically—and where judicial practice diverges most 
widely from statutory and constitutional requirements. Thirty-plus 
years after federal and state statutes were rewritten to fix this precise 
problem by permitting judges to order dangerous defendants to be 
detained, money bail is still used as a back-door means to manage 
dangerousness, even in cases where there is no serious risk of flight.114 
Properly calculated, money bail is set at the precise amount that 
will induce a released defendant to return to court (or, conversely, the 
 
in other cases not . . .”). Judges may also set high bail to induce defendants to plead guilty. See 
Simonson, supra note 9, at 21–22. 
 110. Shaila Dewan, When Bail Is Out of Defendant’s Reach, Other Costs Mount, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/11/us/when-bail-is-out-of-defendants-
reach-other-costs-mount.html [hereinafter Dewan, Defendant’s Reach]. The defendant, 
teenager Allen Bullock, was charged with throwing a traffic cone through the windshield of a 
police car during an April 2015 protest of the police-related death of Freddie Gray. Justin 
Fenton, Teen charged with riot at downtown protest gets 6 months, community service, BALT. SUN 
(Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/in-depth/bs-
md-ci-bullock-riot-plea-20160229-story.html. 
 111. Dewan, Defendant’s Reach, supra note 110. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.; see also, e.g., Associated Press, Memo: Violence long simmered between rival Texas 
biker gangs, WACO TRIBUNE-HERALD (May 19, 2015), http://www.wacotrib.com/news/
twin-peaks-biker-shooting/memo-violence-long-simmered-between-rival-texas-biker-gangs/ar
ticle_94584d74-fe21-11e4-b1cb-3706e00320a8.html (setting bail at $1 million for subjects in 
shootout based on public safety concerns); Sophia Kazmi, Judge sets $3 million bail for suspect in 
Livermore road rage killing, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 22, 2011), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_17909960 ($3 million bail for suspect deemed by judge to 
be “‘an extreme danger to the community’”). 
 114. S. Rep. No. 98-225 (1983), supra note 53 (stating that in 1983, Congress made a 
“significant departure” from the basic philosophy of the Bail Reform Act” by empowering courts 
to consider a defendant’s dangerousness when making pretrial detention decisions). Even with 
this additional power, however, courts still often turn to money bail as a means of managing 
dangerousness instead of using the power to detain dangerous defendants awaiting trial as 
explained above. 
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amount of money that will dissuade a released defendant from fleeing 
the jurisdiction). Although there are real debates about how well bail 
serves this purpose, there is not much to debate about the purpose of 
bail.115 When priced to ensure detention on the basis of dangerousness, 
money bail violates both law and policy.116 
In many jurisdictions, statutes governing the setting of bail 
expressly state that the purpose of bail is to ensure appearance.117 Many 
jurisdictions also expressly condition the forfeiture of bail (i.e., the loss 
of bail money) on a failure to appear, not on the commission of a new 
offense. These provisions are consistent with a long history that makes 
clear that money bail is a tool for managing flight risk, not a legitimate 
means of managing danger.118 
Suggesting that bail—which is of questionable utility in managing 
flight risk, the very risk it was developed to manage—should be 
extended to manage public safety risk is also simply illogical. There is 
no evidence that threatening to withhold a bail payment if a person 
commits a crime while on pretrial release provides any marginal 
deterrence value over the existing blanket of criminal sanctions and 
penalties that a new crime would trigger. Viewed slightly differently, 
if a court views a defendant as being a high risk for committing a new 
crime on release, it does not seem appropriate to simply set a high 
price for release. Dangerous defendants do not become less dangerous 
by paying bail.119 
Whatever path to detention is followed, and whatever rationale 
judges might claim drives their decisions, modern studies reinforce 
decades-old claims:120 our jails contain far too many low-risk 
detainees.121 For misdemeanor detainees, there are estimates that as 
 
 115. See infra Section II.C. 
 116. SCHNACKE, supra note 28, at 14 (2014) (“[M]oney set with a purpose to detain is 
likely unlawful under numerous theories of law, and is also unnecessary given the Supreme 
Court’s approval of a lawful detention scheme that uses no money whatsoever.”). 
 117. See infra Section II.C. 
 118. See supra Section I.A. 
 119. SCHNACKE, supra note 28, at 14 (“[N]o study has ever shown that money can protect 
the public.”). 
 120. See GOLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 16, at 18 (describing historical criticism 
of the effectiveness of bail: “jails appeared to hold a substantial number of defendants who could 
be characterized as good release risks”). 
 121. Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 19, at 553 (“[A]bout half of those detained have 
a lower chance of being rearrested pretrial than many of the people released.”); Tina Rosenberg, 
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many as twenty percent of detainees will not be convicted and some 
portion of those who are convicted will not be sentenced to jail time.122 
D. Mismeasuring Flight and Danger 
Judges’ measurement of pretrial risk factors has long been the 
subject of criticism and, therefore, a perennial target of reform 
efforts.123 Dating at least to the Vera Institute of Justice’s Manhattan 
Bail Project in the 1960s, bail reformers have studied which factors 
best predict which defendants pose a flight risk, and, as statutes have 
evolved, which factors correlate to dangerousness.124 As outlined 
below, in recent years this process has shifted from reliance on judges’ 
relatively subjective evaluations of statutory factors to the growing use 
of more objective, actuarial-style measurement tools. 
1. Traditional approaches and statutory factors 
Legislators have endeavored to guide judicial discretion within the 
pretrial detention decision-making process by including predictive 
factors in federal and state bail statutes. Those statutory factors 
generally fall into the following categories: the “nature and 
circumstances” of the charged offense; the “weight of the evidence” 
against the defendant; the defendant’s criminal history (including the 
defendant’s record of prior appearances at court proceedings); the 
defendant’s “character, physical and mental condition” (including any 
 
Putting Fewer Innocents Behind Bars, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2015), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/07/03/putting-fewer-innocents-behind-
bars/?_r=0 (“Pretrial detention should be reserved for flight risks or dangers to society. Yet 62 
percent of people in jail in America are awaiting trial [up from 40 percent 30 years ago]—and 
most are charged with crimes no more dangerous than shoplifting, driving with a suspended 
license, public drunkenness, drug possession, missing their curfew or otherwise violating 
parole.”); ARNOLD FOUND., RESEARCH SUMMARY 5, supra note 96 (explaining that, under the 
current approach, “too many high-risk defendants go free, and too many low-risk defendants 
remain locked up for long periods. These systemic failures put the public in danger and place 
unnecessary strain on budgets, jails, law enforcement, families, and communities.”). 
 122. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION 
OF LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 2 (2010). 
 123. Goldkamp & Vilcica, supra note 16, at 116 (“The main explanation for the 
limited success of bail reform lies in its failure to engage judges centrally, to make bail 
reform ‘judicial’ reform.”). 
 124. Scott Kohler, Vera Institute of Justice: Manhattan Bail Project, FORD FOUND. (1962), 
http://cspcs.sanford.duke.edu/sites/default/files/descriptive/manhattan_bail_project.pdf. 
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substance abuse history); and his or her ties to the jurisdiction 
(employment, family, or length of residence).125 Notably, however, the 
statutes do not indicate which factors are relevant to flight risk and 
which are believed to predict dangerousness.126 
Traditionally, the information about these statutory factors was 
gathered prior to a defendant’s bail hearing. Some of the information 
(e.g., the charge, the defendant’s criminal history, and the defendant’s 
record of appearances) could be easily obtained from public records. 
Information about substance abuse or family ties, on the other hand, 
was gathered through an interview with the defendant. 
2. Bail schedules 
In the past, some states, like California, have gone further: 
creating bail schedules that effectively supplant judicial discretion by 
setting presumptive dollar amounts for bail that are based exclusively 
on the charged offense.127 These types of bail schedules, which do not 
adjust for defendants’ financial resources, have recently come under 
attack in a series of lawsuits.128 As Sam Wiseman explains, charge-
driven bail schedules are “the worst sort of ‘actuarial’ instrument, and 
their widespread use is an indicator of both how little time judges have 
 
 125. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2012); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2) (McKinney 
Supp. 2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2937.222(C) (LexisNexis 2014); TENN. CODE § 40-11-
115(b) (2012); FLA. STAT. § 903.046(2) (2016). But see Wiseman, Discrimination, supra note 21, 
at 155 (asserting that, although these statutory factors may be relevant to determining what the 
right amount of bail is, they will lead to improper discrimination if used by judges to determine the 
“threshold question” of who is eligible for bail). 
 126. See infra Section III.D for a discussion of which release conditions best manage flight 
risk or dangerousness. 
 127. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA: A SURVEY OF COUNTY 
PRETRIAL RELEASE POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND OUTCOMES 5–6 (2009) (describing bail 
schedule procedures); see also SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 29 (“In some jurisdictions, 
police commanders have the authority to release people directly from the station house using a 
bail schedule.”). 
 128. See supra notes 101–108 and accompanying text. Scholars have also been explicit 
about the flaws with bail schedules. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 16, at 445–46 (“The crime 
charged is an extremely rough, singular indicator of likely dangerousness and flight risk 
compared to the sophisticated actuarial models deployed elsewhere, and judges augment this 
rudimentary predictor only with impressionistic assessments reached after questioning a 
defendant for a few minutes, at best.”). 
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to devote to pretrial release determinations and how little accuracy 
appears to matter in most systems.”129 
3. Data-driven risk assessment tools 
Over the last decade, reform efforts have focused on moving away 
from reliance on charge-driven bail schedules or judges’ “gut and 
intuition” and toward using “rigorous, scientific, data-driven risk 
assessments.”130 Federal courts and courts in New Jersey, Kentucky, 
and Colorado, among others, are increasingly employing risk 
assessment tools that promise more accurate and efficient risk 
calculations to refine judges’ pretrial detention decisions.131 While in 
2015 fewer than ten percent of jurisdictions used “scientifically 
validated risk assessments . . . partly because of cost,” that number is 
rapidly growing, particularly as less costly tools are being developed.132 
a. The federal tool. The Federal Risk Assessment Tool relies on nine 
key factors to predict pretrial risk, including (1) “charges pending 
against the defendant at the time of arrest,” (2) “number of prior 
misdemeanor arrests,” (3) “number of prior felony arrests,” (4) 
“number of prior failures to appear,” (5) employment status of 
defendant at the time of arrest, (6) defendant’s residency status, 
(7) defendant’s substance abuse problems, (8) “nature of the primary 
charge,” and (9) if the primary charge is a misdemeanor or a felony.133 
 
 129. Id. at 446. 
 130. ARNOLD FOUND., RESEARCH SUMMARY, supra note 96, at 5. 
 131. MARIE VANNOSTRAND & CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, ARNOLD FOUND., 
ASSESSING PRETRIAL RISK WITHOUT A DEFENDANT INTERVIEW (2013), 
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_no-
interview_FNL.pdf; Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical 
Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 233 (2015) (summarizing evolution of risk assessment 
tools and observing that automated risk assessment “is enjoying its heyday in criminal justice”). 
There are a number of competing risk assessment tools, but studies suggest that, among those 
most commonly used, there are not significant differences in their “predictive validity.” NATHAN 
JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44087, RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2015) (citing 2010 study comparing tools that predict violent recidivism) 
(discussing theories that explain why the different tools yield the same outcomes). 
 132. Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture With Formula for Bail, N.Y. TIMES (June 
26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-granting-of-bail-into-a-
science.html?_r=0 [hereinafter Dewan, Judges]. 
 133. Marie VanNostrand et al., Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court, FED. PROB., 
Sept. 2009, at 3, 5. 
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Points for each of these risk factors are tallied into a single 
comprehensive risk value (lumping risks of flight and dangerousness 
together) during pretrial release.134 This single risk assessment includes 
two separate sections, but each section contains factors relevant to 
both types of predictions: (i) criminal history and current offense and 
(ii) other factors.135 
By 2011, federal judges were relying on the federal risk assessment 
tool in about one out of six cases.136 
b. Selected state risk assessment tools. A number of states have 
adopted risk assessment tools that are similar to the federal tool.137 The 
Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (“VPRAI”) is one of the 
oldest and has served as a model for other states. Like the federal tool, 
VPRAI generates one single risk score (which predicts a combined risk 
of flight and dangerousness) for a judge to evaluate at a pretrial 
detention hearing.138 VPRAI relies on eight factors that were found to 
be statistically significant in predicting pretrial failure. These factors 
fall into the same general categories as the federal factors.139 
The Colorado Pretrial Assessment Tool (CPAT) operates similarly 
to the tools used at the federal level and in Virginia, but has twelve 
relevant factors.140 CPAT includes the same factors seen in the federal 
 
 134. Id. at 13, 21 (combining failure to appear and dangerousness into one risk figure; 
evaluating various alternatives to detention and evaluating whether (and to what extent) the 
alternatives would mitigate a combined risk of flight and dangerousness). Although the study of 
the federal risk assessment tool combined failure to appear and dangerousness into one risk figure 
to be used by a judge evaluating the risks, the study did disaggregate the risks for measuring 
outcomes. In other words, the data did note which defendants did not appear for court and 
which defendants committed a new crime. Id. at 13. 
 135. See id. 
 136. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 16, at 421 (citing Timothy P. Cadigan & 
Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Implementing Risk Assessment in the Federal Pretrial Services System, 
FED. PROB., Sept. 2011, at 33). 
 137. For a detailed review of the risk assessment instruments currently being used across 
the country, see Sandra Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, at 8–14, appendix, (forthcoming). 
 138. See MARIE VANNOSTRAND & KENNETH J. ROSE, PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT IN 
VIRGINIA, 8–9 (2009), http://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/VA%20Risk
%20Report%202009.pdf. 
 139. Id. at 8. 
 140. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE COLORADO PRETRIAL ASSESSMENT TOOL 13 (rev. 
Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/CO%20Pretrial%20
Assessment%20Tool%20Report%20Rev%20-%20PJI%202012.pdf. The twelve factors include: 
“(1) Having a Home or Cell Phone; (2) Owning or Renting One’s Residence; (3) Contributing 
to Residential Payments; (4) Past or Current Problems with Alcohol; (5) Past or Current Mental 
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assessment and in Virginia, but also adds factors like “having a home 
or cell phone” and “owning or renting one’s residence.”141 As at the 
federal level and in Virginia, Colorado defendants are given a single 
risk score, which places them into one of four risk categories.142 Florida 
and Ohio employ risk assessment tools that are similar to the Colorado 
and Virginia tools.143 
c. The Public Safety Assessment—Court tool. In June 2015, the 
Laura and John Arnold Foundation announced a rollout of its 
algorithm (the Public Safety Assessment-Court or “PSA-Court”), 
which gives each defendant two scores—one for risk of flight and one 
for risk of committing a crime while on release.144 The tool also 
highlights those defendants who pose a special risk of violence.145 The 
separation of these risk scores was one of the Foundation’s priorities 
from the beginning of the project, and this feature marks a significant 
improvement over other tools.146 The PSA-Court tool is now used in 
 
Health Treatment; (6) Age at First Arrest; (7) Past Jail Sentence; (8) Past Prison Sentence; (9) 
Having Active Warrants; (10) Having Other Pending Cases; (11) Currently on Supervision; (12) 
History of Revoked Bond or Supervision.” Id.  
 141. Id. 
 142. In Colorado, judges seem to be given more information about whether that single 
risk score is more predictive of flight risk or danger, but those two risks are, again, not expressed 
as separate risk numbers. The defendant’s success rate in each of the categories can be measured 
against an average defendant’s score in that category, whether it be public safety, failure to 
appear, or a combination of both. Id. 
 143. See generally JFA INST., FLORIDA PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT 13 
(2012), http://www.pretrial.org/download/risk-assessment/FL%20Pretrial%20Risk%20Ass
essment%20Report%20%282012%29.pdf; EDWARD LATESSA ET AL., CREATION AND 
VALIDATION OF THE OHIO RISK ASSESSMENT SYSTEM FINAL REPORT 49 (2009), 
http://www.ocjs.ohio.gov/ORAS_FinalReport.pdf. 
 144. Dewan, Judges, supra note 132; see also ARNOLD FOUND., RESULTS FROM THE FIRST 
SIX MONTHS OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT—COURT IN KENTUCKY 3 (2014), 
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/PSA-Court-Kentucky-6-
Month-Report.pdf [hereinafter ARNOLD FOUND., RESULTS]. 
 145. ARNOLD FOUND., RESEARCH SUMMARY, supra note 96, at 4; see also ARNOLD 
FOUND., RESULTS, supra note 144, at 3. 
 146. ARNOLD FOUND., RESEARCH SUMMARY, supra note 96, at 3 (explaining that federal 
and Virginia tools “present[ed] a single risk level for each defendant, combining—and assigning 
equal weight to—the risk that a defendant will fail to appear and the risk that he will reoffend”). 
It is important to recognize that this separation of risks was contemplated by bail reformers John 
Goldkamp and Michael Gottfredson in their study in the late 1970s to develop bail guidelines 
for use in Philadelphia courts. GOLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 16, at 100–01. That 
study marked the first use of these actuarial-type “prediction instruments.” Id. Goldkamp and 
Gottfredson developed, but did not ultimately employ in their study, four separate prediction 
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twenty-nine jurisdictions in the United States, including three entire 
states: Arizona, Kentucky, and New Jersey.147 
Part of the appeal of the PSA-Court tool is that it is “designed 
to be more economical than existing risk assessments and effective 
regardless of location.”148 According to the Foundation, it is “more 
objective, far less expensive, and requires fewer resources to 
administer than previous techniques.”149 The PSA-Court tool 
promises these substantial cost savings because it does not require 
defendant interviews.150 
The new tool has three separate six-point scales (each ranging 
from the lowest level of risk, one, to the highest, six).151 Two of these 
scales produce “dangerousness” predictions: one scale for “new 
criminal activity” (which calculates the likelihood that the defendant 
will commit [any] new crime while on pretrial release) and one scale 
for “new violent criminal activity.” The third scale calculates the risk 
of “failure to appear.” 
Critics of risk assessment tools highlight a range of potential 
problems that the tools present,152 but their critiques neglect the 
problem identified in this Article. With any tool that promises to 
improve decision-making, it is imperative to determine how well that 
tool maps onto existing legal requirements. Too many of the federal 
 
instruments that generated separate risk measures for failure to appear, rearrest, serious rearrest, 
and combined measures. Id. 
 147. ARNOLD FOUND., PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT, supra note 14, 
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/initiative/criminal-justice/crime-prevention/public-
safety-assessment/; see also Dewan, Judges, supra note 132. 
 148. Dewan, Judges, supra note 132. The tool is locally validated, meaning that the 
predictions for a particular jurisdiction are based on local data. 
 149. ARNOLD FOUND., SAFETY ASSESSMENT, supra note 14. 
 150. ARNOLD FOUND., RESEARCH SUMMARY, supra note 96; Dewan, Judges, supra 
note 132. 
 151. ARNOLD FOUND., RESEARCH SUMMARY, supra note 96 (“[T]he likelihood of a 
negative pretrial outcome increases with each successive point on the scale.”). 
 152. For more detailed analyses and critiques of these tools, see, e.g., Melissa Hamilton, 
Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Challenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 242–
71 (2015) (analyzing evidence-based sentencing schemes and determining that the use of 
socioeconomic and demographic variables to contribute to a defendant’s sentence may violate 
the equal protection and due process clauses); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the 
Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 851 (2014) (critiquing 
existing evidence-based regimes and urging approaches that would “base actuarial prediction 
only on crime characteristics and criminal history” and that would strip “demographic and 
socioeconomic factors”); John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm 
Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 392–93 (2006). 
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and state risk assessment tools merge the analysis of flight risk and 
dangerousness into a single risk assessment calculation, the PSA-Court 
risk assessment tool being a notable exception. Because of this 
problem, these tools run the risk of reinforcing (instead of correcting) 
problematic judicial practices. The following Part outlines the legal 
and policy reasons that flight risk must be measured independently 
of dangerousness. 
II. DISENTANGLING FLIGHT FROM DANGER: LEGAL 
REQUIREMENTS 
Judges making pretrial decisions often merge the risk of 
dangerousness with the risk of flight. Perhaps as a result, reformers 
(including many of those developing actuarial risk prediction models) 
also merge these risks. Why is combining the risks problematic? This 
Article asserts that flight risk and danger must be analyzed separately 
both because of legal requirements (outlined in this part) and for 
policy reasons (examined in Part III). 
The first reason that flight risk must be measured and evaluated 
independently of dangerousness is that the federal and state laws 
governing pretrial detention and release (that were described in broad 
strokes in Section I.D) frequently require separate consideration of 
these distinct risks. As outlined in detail in the sections that follow, 
these legal requirements are the product of both (i) constitutional and 
statutory limitations on the circumstances in which pretrial detention 
can be ordered by a judge and (ii) constitutional and statutory 
provisions governing the imposition of bail or other conditions of 
release. This Part addresses both types of restrictions in turn, 
highlighting aspects of these provisions that explicitly and implicitly 
require independent risk assessment. 
A. Constitutional Constraints 
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of the Bail Reform Act in its 1987 decision in United States v. 
Salerno.153 The Salerno Court viewed the word “excessive” to be doing 
important work in the bail clause.154 As the Salerno Court explained: 
 
 153. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
 154. See Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1383 (“Salerno did not completely empty 
the clause of content: regardless of what ends are permissible, ‘excessive’-ness clearly implies an 
inquiry into the relationship between those ends and the means employed to achieve them.”). 
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The only arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the 
Government’s proposed conditions of release or detention not be 
“excessive” in light of the perceived evil. Of course, to determine 
whether the Government’s response is excessive, we must compare 
that response against the interest the Government seeks to protect 
by means of that response. Thus, when the Government has 
admitted that its only interest is in preventing flight, bail must be set 
by a court at a sum designed to ensure that goal, and no more.155 
This inquiry into “excessiveness” requires the government to be 
explicit about the risks it seeks to manage and precise in proposing 
restrictions (detention or conditions of release) to respond to those 
risks. Separation of flight risk and dangerousness will be essential to 
this inquiry. The dearth of successful excessive bail claims in the 
decades since Salerno suggest that the limits of the statutes and the 
Salerno decision are not well understood.156 
B. Ordering Detention: Statutory Limitations 
Under the federal Bail Reform Act and in nearly all states, when a 
judge determines that no combination of release conditions will 
adequately manage flight risk and danger, he or she is empowered to 
order that a defendant be detained until trial. Because federal and state 
statutes often pair flight risk and danger together,157 there is a 
conventional misconception that both types of risks are relevant for 
every type of determination made under these detention provisions. 
The provisions of federal and state detention statutes, however, clearly 
 
 155. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754. 
 156. See Sandra Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, at 7 (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author) (explaining that despite the holding’s clear limitations, “Salerno was widely 
perceived as a robust endorsement of pretrial preventive detention and lesser forms of preventive 
restraint”); see also Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1384 (“A richer jurisprudence of 
excessiveness is needed.”). Although the Salerno’s “excessive bail” analysis has not been revisited, 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly cited Salerno in support of other facial challenges to statutes, 
see, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2515 (2012) (“The fact that [a law] might 
operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render 
it wholly invalid”), and occasionally to reiterate that “[e]nsuring public safety” is “a fundamental 
regulatory goal,” Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 108 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment). 
 157. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (repeatedly pairing the court’s obligation to “assure the 
appearance” of a defendant with its obligation to protect “the safety of any other person or the 
community”); KY § 431.525 (pairing “flight risk” and “danger”); 15 M.R.S.A. § 1002 (pairing 
appearance and safety). 
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call for segregated risk assessment. Those provisions are addressed in 
the following subsections. 
1. Ordering pretrial detention after Salerno: Modern federal 
statutory requirements 
There are at least three aspects of the detention provisions of the 
federal Bail Reform Act that require independent risk analysis. Those 
include provisions that (i) outline the government’s burden of proof, 
(ii) indicate when a detention hearing may be held, and (iii) restrict 
the scope of a detention hearing. While the federal pretrial reports that 
judges rely upon to make bail determinations do separate these risks, 
the federal risk assessment tool curiously does not.158 
The first statutory distinction between flight risk and 
dangerousness relates to the government’s burden of proof. The 
government’s burden of proof for preventive (i.e., danger-based) 
detention—clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness—is 
higher than the preponderance of the evidence standard that has been 
applied to flight risk determinations.159 As outlined in Part I, this 
heightened standard of proof of danger was one of the reasons that 
the Salerno Court specifically cited for upholding the constitutionality 
of the Bail Reform Act.160 If the standards of proof for the two types 
of risks are different, the risks must be analyzed separately. 
A second and less obvious requirement to distinguish between 
flight and danger emerges from the cases decided since Salerno. Lower 
federal courts are split on how the dangerousness and flight risk 
provisions of the Bail Reform Act interact with each other, particularly 
as they relate to a district court’s decisions (i) to hold a detention 
hearing and (ii) to order detention. Although flight risk can be 
grounds for a detention order in any federal case, most courts have 
held that dangerousness may only be grounds for detention under the 
circumstances specified in the statute. 
 
 158. See supra Section I.D.3. 
 159. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2012) (“The facts the judicial officer uses to support a 
finding . . . that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of 
any other person and the community shall be supported by clear and convincing evidence.”). 
Although the statute is silent on the government’s burden of proof for flight risk, several courts 
have agreed that it is a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Himler, 797 
F.2d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 160. See supra Section I.B.3; see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751–52. 
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The Third Circuit in United States v. Himler was the first court to 
consider this issue.161 Himler was charged with crimes involving the 
production of false identification documents and the government 
argued that he posed a serious risk of flight and should be detained.162 
Given both Himler’s criminal history (he had a prior larceny 
conviction and was on probation for possession of false identification 
when arrested for the current crime) and the nature of the current 
charge, the district court determined that he had experience in 
adopting a false identity.163 For that reason, in the district court’s view, 
Himler posed both a serious flight risk and a danger to the community 
and was ordered detained until trial.164 
The key issue for the Third Circuit on appeal was whether the 
district court properly relied on the defendant’s risk to public safety in 
ordering detention.165 The district court had blended the two risks—
flight and public safety—to justify its ruling. The court’s decision 
turned on the operation of two provisions of the federal statute. 
Section 3142(e)166 authorizes a judge to order pretrial detention, but 
specifies that the detention order may only be issued “after a hearing 
pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f).”167 The provisions 
enumerated in Section 3142(f)(1) permit detention for dangerousness 
only in cases that involve crimes of violence, offenses with potential 
sentences of life imprisonment or death, certain narcotics offenses, 
offenders with two or more serious prior convictions, crimes involving 
minor victims, and crimes involving weapons.168 
 
 161. 797 F.2d 156 (1986). The Himler Court addressed this issue before the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Salerno was issued. It primarily relied on legislative history to interpret the 
statute, while later circuit courts cited legislative history and Salerno. Id. at 160 (quoting S. REP. 
NO. 98-225, at 6–7 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3189) (reviewing the 
legislative history of the Bail Reform Act). 
 162. Id. at 158. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 160–61. 
 166. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2012). 
 167. Subsection (f) has two provisions. The first provision addresses when certain types of 
crimes (viewed as posing higher public safety risks) will trigger a detention hearing. That 
provision is the focus of the next several paragraphs. The second provision of subsection (f) 
permits a detention hearing to be held to manage other potential risks (including flight risk) and 
that provision is discussed next. See infra notes 180–190 and accompanying text. 
 168. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1). On the government’s motion, a detention hearing may be 
held in these cases. Id. For a critique of these and other statutory presumptions that drug offenses 
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The Himler court held that “the requisite circumstances for 
invoking a detention hearing . . . serve to limit the types of cases in 
which detention may be ordered prior to trial.”169 According to the 
court, this narrow reading was required because, based on its review 
of the legislative history, the drafters of the Bail Reform Act intended 
the statute’s preventive detention provisions to apply narrowly to “a 
small but identifiable group of particularly dangerous defendants.”170 
For other types of crimes not listed in subsection (f)(1), including, 
for example, the false identification charge in Himler and the bank 
fraud and false statements charges considered by the First Circuit in a 
similar case,171 a detention hearing may not be held and, consequently, 
a defendant may not be detained for dangerousness. In other words, 
for less serious crimes that are not specified in the statute, a 
defendant’s danger to the community cannot justify detention under 
the Act.172 In those cases, then, a federal court making a pretrial 
detention decision must have an independent assessment of flight risk 
because that is the only risk that could justify detention. The First, 
Second, Fifth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits have all 
followed the Third Circuit’s approach in Himler.173 
 
predict future violence, see Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227, 254 
(2015) [hereinafter Baradaran, Drugs] (“[S]ometimes there is a blanket presumption by courts 
and legislatures that where there are drugs, guns will be found and inevitably violence—without 
empirical backing or an individual showing based on particularized facts. This blanket 
presumption by courts and legislatures that drugs cause violence is separated from the empirical 
reality and disconnected from the wealth of social science research . . . .”). 
 169. Himler, 797 F.2d at 160 (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 20 (1983), reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3203). 
 170. Id. at 160 (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182, 3189). The list of offenses that can trigger detention for dangerousness have broadened 
since Himler was decided. In 2006, the statute was amended and subsection (f)(1)(e) was added. 
Under the amended language, felonies involving weapons or children can trigger a detention 
hearing. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 216, 
120 Stat. 587 (2006); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(e). 
 171. United States v. Ploof, 851 F.2d 7, 9, 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating defendant’s 
charges, including conspiracy to make false statements on a mortgage loan application, making 
false statements to a national bank, willful misapplication of bank funds, bank fraud, a narcotics 
offense, interstate transportation of stolen property, unlawful structuring of a financial 
transaction, and a claim by the government that defendant had plotted to kill his girlfriend’s 
husband were not deemed to trigger detention hearing). 
 172. Himler, 797 F.2d at 160. 
 173. Ploof, 851 F.2d at 11 (holding that a person’s threat to the safety of any other person 
or the community, in the absence of one of the statutorily specified circumstances, cannot justify 
detention under the Act); United States v. Twine, 344 F.3d 987, 987 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); 
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Although the United States Attorney’s Manual expresses the 
majority rule as the standard,174 the government has occasionally 
argued for, and at least two district courts have adopted, a different 
interpretation: that Section 3142(f) is not exhaustive and merely 
mandates when the government must be given a hearing.175 Under 
this view, which contradicts the majority approach, judges have the 
option to hold a detention hearing and order detention even in cases 
that do not fall within the provisions of Section 3142(f).176 
The Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on this issue, but its 
earlier holding in Salerno provides strong support for the majority 
view.177 In upholding the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act, the 
Salerno Court explicitly held that the Act was sufficiently protective of 
individual liberty interests because it was limited in reach. In the 
Court’s words, the Act was constitutional because of “Congress’ 
careful delineation of the circumstances under which detention will be 
 
United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (same); United States v. Byrd, 969 
F.2d 106, 109–10 (5th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Friedman, 837 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 
1988) (same). The majority of district courts that have addressed the issue have also followed 
this approach. 
Because of later statutory amendments that broadened the categories of offenses that could 
trigger detention for dangerousness, see supra note 170, the felon-in-possession charges in Twine 
and Singleton and the child pornography charges in Byrd and Friedman would come out 
differently under the current statute. See Twine, 344 F.3d at 987 (defendant’s charge [felon in 
possession of a firearm] did not trigger detention hearing); Singleton, 182 F.3d at 9 (same); 
Byrd, 969 F.2d at 109–10 (defendant’s child pornography possession charge did not trigger 
detention hearing); Friedman, 837 F.2d at 49 (defendant’s child pornography charges did not 
trigger detention hearing). 
 174. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RELEASE AND DETENTION PENDING JUDICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS, 26 CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL (1997), 
http://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-26-release-and-detention-pending-
judicial-proceedings-18-usc-3141-et. 
 175. United States v. Megahed, 519 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1245–49 (M.D. Fla. 2007) 
(holding that § 3142(f) does not limit the circumstances under which a defendant may be 
detained); see also United States v. Ritter, No. 2:08po00031-35, 2008 WL 345832, at *1–2 
(W.D. Va. 2008) (following the Megahed approach). 
 176. Id. Although these two district courts (in Megahed and Ritter) have held that 
detention is not limited to the circumstances in § 3142(f), several district courts in their same 
circuits have agreed with Himler, Ploof, Friedman, and Byrd. See Holmes, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 
1344–51; United States v. Giordano, 370 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1260 (S.D. Fla. 2005); United 
States v. DeBeir, 16 F. Supp. 2d 592, 593 (D. Md. 1998); United States v. Allen, 409 F. Supp. 
2d 622, 625 (D. Md. 2006). 
 177. See supra Section II.A. 
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permitted.”178 The Court elaborated that the Act “operates only on 
individuals who have been arrested for a specific category of extremely 
serious offenses” and that “Congress specifically found that these 
individuals are far more likely to be responsible for dangerous acts in 
the community after arrest.”179 Under the majority view, then, at least 
in certain types of cases, flight risk must be measured separately 
because it is the only type of risk that can trigger a detention hearing. 
A third set of cases also requires independent assessment of flight 
risk: cases where a detention hearing is statutorily authorized because 
a defendant poses a “serious” risk of flight.180 Here again, Section 
3142(e) of the statute states that a judge may issue a detention order 
only “after a hearing pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f).”181 
In the category of cases just discussed, the relevant provision is 
subsection (f)(1), which permits a detention hearing for certain types 
of more serious crimes.182 Section 3142(f)(2)(A) also permits a court 
to hold a detention hearing “in a case that involves . . . a serious risk 
that such person will flee.”183 
The question in these cases is whether, when flight risk is what 
triggers a detention hearing, a court can consider public safety risk at 
the hearing as well.184 Courts also differ about the scope of these flight 
hearings. The prevailing approach is that the specific authorization for 
the detention hearing must be the basis for the court’s detention 
 
 178. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987). 
 179. Id. at 750. 
 180. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A) (2012) (allowing a court to hold a detention hearing [on 
a motion from the government or on the court’s own motion] “in a case that involves . . . a 
serious risk that [the defendant] will flee”). Compare Himler, 797 F.2d at 159–60, with Holmes, 
438 F. Supp. 2d at 1344–51. 
 181. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e); see supra notes 167 and 168 and accompanying text, describing 
the two provisions of subsection (f). 
 182. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1). 
 183. Id. § 3142(f)(2)(A). Subsection (f)(2)(B) also includes some obstruction of justice 
provisions (but it does not permit broad consideration of public safety risk). It permits the court 
to consider detention for a defendant when faced with “a serious risk that such person will 
obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to threaten, 
injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness or juror.” Id. § 3142(f)(2)(B). 
 184. To be clear, if both risks are present and, based on the statute, both risks are legitimate 
bases for detention, then both risks can be considered together by a judge making a decision 
whether to detain. 
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decision.185 Under this view, if the hearing is held because the 
defendant is a serious flight risk (and if the offense of arrest does not 
fall within the public safety risk categories outlined in subsection (f)(1) 
of the statute), then these courts would only permit detention to be 
justified based on flight risk.186 
This issue was also first addressed by Himler, which held that when 
the hearing is held pursuant to a defendant’s risk of flight, “[a]ny 
danger . . . he may present to the community may be considered only 
in setting conditions of release.”187 In other words, if flight risk is the 
trigger for the hearing, then the defendant may not be ordered 
detained based on dangerousness; he may only be detained on the 
basis of flight.188 This aspect of Himler has also been adopted by most 
other federal courts that have addressed the issue.189 The First Circuit, 
following suit in Ploof, explained that the more narrow view of the 
statute was consistent with both the legislative history and with 
Salerno.190 The takeaway from these cases is strict adherence to the 
statute’s division of these risks. Proof of a serious flight risk can justify 
detention in any kind of case. Danger can only justify detention in the 
more serious cases specified in the statute. 
 
 185. Himler, 797 F.2d at 160; Giordano, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 1261–64; DeBeir, 16 F. Supp. 
2d at 595; United States v. LaLonde, 246 F. Supp. 2d 873, 875 (S.D. Ohio 2003); Chavez-
Rivas, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 967–68; United States v. Dodge, 842 F. Supp. 643, 645 (D. 
Conn. 1994). 
 186. Himler, 797 F.2d at 160. 
 187. Himler, 797 F.2d at 160 (emphasis added). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Friedman, 837 F.2d at 49; Ploof, 851 F.2d at 10–12; Giordano, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 
1261–64; DeBeir, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 595; LaLonde, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 875; Chavez-Rivas, 536 
F. Supp. 2d at 967–68; Dodge, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 645. The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. 
Byrd, held that it is “in agreement with the First and Third Circuits.” United States v. Byrd, 969 
F.2d 106, 109–10 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[A] defendant’s threat to safety of other person or to the 
community, standing alone, will not justify pre-trial detention.”). Lower courts applying Byrd, 
however, have reached conflicting results. Compare, e.g., Giordano, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 1261 with 
Holmes, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 1345 (interpreting Byrd to hold that § 3142(f) only establishes when 
a hearing is authorized, and once met, the defendant can be detained on dangerous alone). This 
may be due, in part, to the Fifth Circuit’s own discomfort with the Byrd holding. The Byrd court 
acknowledged that it “may be surprising . . . that even after a hearing, detention can be ordered 
only in certain designated and limited circumstances, irrespective of whether the defendant’s 
release may jeopardize public safety.” Byrd, 969 F.2d at 109–10. 
 190. Ploof, 851 F.2d at 10–12 (holding that the language of § 3142(e)–(f) require that the 
basis for the detention must be based on the specific authorization for the hearing; detention 
based solely on a finding of future dangerous is only authorized when a hearing is held pursuant 
to § 3142(f)(1)). 
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Properly interpreted, then, there are multiple aspects of the 
detention provisions of the Bail Reform Act that require separate 
consideration of flight risk and danger. Many state statutes contain 
similar provisions, as discussed in the next subsection. 
2. State statutes authorizing judges to order pretrial detention 
Like the federal statute, many states permit preventive pretrial 
detention for individuals who have been arrested for certain more 
serious crimes.191 Some states even require detention in certain cases.192 
New Jersey was an exception to this rule until recently. In 2014, 
New Jersey made comprehensive changes to its state bail laws. The 
legislature passed a statute that shifts away from reliance on money 
bail193 and voters approved a constitutional amendment to permit 
detention based on public safety concerns.194 
New York continues to be an outlier by prohibiting judges from 
making discretionary decisions to deny bail based on public safety 
concerns.195 But that does not mean that there is not preventive 
 
 191. See, e.g, VT. STAT. tit. 13, § 7553 (2009) (“A person charged with an offense 
punishable by life imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is great may be held without bail.”); 
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13 (outlining situations [involving certain serious felonies] where courts 
may deny bail); S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-5-510 (Supp. 2015) (empowering courts to deny bail for 
certain violent offenses); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 11a (same). 
 192. These are typically cases involving capital crimes. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 765.5 (West 2000) (“No person charged with treason or murder shall be admitted to bail if 
the proof of his guilt is evident or the presumption great.”); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9 (“All 
persons shall be bailable . . . except for a person who is charged with a capital offense where the 
proof is evident or the presumption great . . . .”). 
 193. 2014 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 31 (2014) (West) (including several new provisions 
that shift away from monetary bail). 
 194. Public Question Results, supra note 10 (amending constitution to eliminate 
constitutional right to bail and to permit judges to order pretrial detention based on public safety 
concerns). As amended, New Jersey Constitution, Article I, Paragraph 11 reads, in part: 
All persons shall, before conviction, be eligible for pretrial release. Pretrial release may 
be denied to a person if the court finds that no amount of monetary bail, non-
monetary conditions of pretrial release, or combination of monetary bail and non-
monetary conditions would reasonably assure the person’s appearance in court when 
required, or protect the safety of any other person or the community, or prevent the 
person from obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process. 
The provision had previously stated: “All persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by 
sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or presumption great.” 
N.J. STAT. ANN. CONST. ART. 1, ¶ 11 (repealed 2014). 
 195. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2)(a) (McKinney 2012) (stating that judges 
setting bail “must consider the kind and degree of control or restriction that is necessary to 
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pretrial detention in New York; for some serious felonies, as a matter 
of law, defendants are ordered detained until trial.196 For other 
offenses, however, New York judges are not permitted to consider a 
defendant’s risk of dangerousness in making discretionary pretrial 
detention decisions.197 And yet they do. 
In 2015, legislation was introduced that would permit judges to 
consider an individual’s potential danger to the community when 
deciding whether to detain an individual.198 Those proposed changes 
have not been adopted, but they have been supported by different 
state and local officials, including, perhaps surprisingly, progressive 
New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio.199 For now, New York judges 
continue to be limited to considering flight risk in making 
discretionary detention and release determinations. 
In a range of state and federal cases, separate consideration of 
flight risk and dangerousness is necessary for a judge to determine 
 
secure [the defendant’s] court attendance when required”; the discretionary bail statute does 
not permit decisions based on public safety); see also People ex rel. Ryan v. Infante, 485 N.Y.S.2d 
852, 854 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1985) (citing § 510.30(2)(a) and noting “that the purpose 
of bail is to secure the defendant’s appearance at all proceedings before the court”) (internal 
citation omitted); People v. Maldonado, 407 N.Y.S.2d 393, 395 (Crim. Ct. 1978) (“The 
statutory structure as to bail is quite clear in that requiring the defendant’s appearance is the 
major consideration in fixing the amount of bail. Danger to the community does not appear to 
be the primary concern of the bail structure.”). 
 196. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(1)(b) (“Determinations of applications for 
recognizance or bail are not in all cases discretionary but are subject to rules, prescribed in article 
five hundred thirty and other provisions of law relating to specific kinds of criminal actions and 
proceedings, providing . . . that [in some cases an application] must as a matter of law be denied 
and the principal committed to or retained in the custody of the sheriff . . . .”). 
 197. See supra note 195. 
 198. S. 5167, 2015 Leg., 238th Sess. (N.Y. 2015) (The proposed amendments provide 
that “[w]ith respect to any principal, the court must consider the kind and degree of control or 
restriction that is necessary to secure his or her court attendance when required and to assure the 
safety of any other person or the community”) (emphasis added). 
 199. Mayor de Blasio’s support was announced in the wake of the murder of a five-year 
veteran officer of the New York Police Department by an individual who had been released prior 
to trial. See A.J. Baker & J. David Goodman, Suspect in Fatal Shooting of New York Officer Was 
on the Run for Weeks, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/22/nyregion/new-york-police-officer-randolph-holder-
fatally-shot-east-harlem.html. The defendant was on bail at the time of the shooting and had 
most recently been arrested for a drug sale charge in late 2014. Id. Following the officer’s death, 
de Blasio expressed outrage at a press conference that the defendant had been sent to a drug 
rehabilitation program rather than traditionally incarcerated. De Blasio Calls For Changes In State 
Bail, Diversion Programs In Wake Of Officer’s Death, CBS N.Y. (Oct. 23, 2015), 
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2015/10/23/de-blasio-diversion-program-changes/. 
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whether denying bail and ordering detention is appropriate. In other 
words, in some cases, flight risk alone must be measured before 
detention may be ordered. As explained in the next Section, statutes 
governing the setting or pricing of bail also require independent        
risk analysis. 
C. Federal and State Provisions Governing the Imposition of Bail 
This Article has already made the logical argument that money bail 
should not be set to manage dangerousness.200 As this Section makes 
clear, the provisions of the federal bail statute and many state bail 
statutes reflect that logic. They describe money bail as a tool for 
managing flight risk—not dangerousness. Courts setting bail 
amounts, then, must have an estimate of flight risk that is independent 
of dangerousness. 
Although part (c) of the federal Bail Reform Act describes 
generally the court’s power to set conditions of release that will both 
assure a defendant’s appearance and protect the community, not all of 
the provisions in the list are intended to manage both flight risk and 
danger.201 The money bail provisions are explicitly flight-focused, 
stating that the money or property to be used as bail must be set at a 
value that the court deems is “reasonably necessary to assure the 
appearance of the person as required.”202 
Federal bail forfeiture provisions reinforce this interpretation of 
the purpose of bail. Forfeiture of federal bail or bond is triggered by 
nonappearance, not by the commission of a new crime on release.203 
 
 200. See supra Section I.C.5. 
 201. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (2012). 
 202. Id. § 3142. The statutes are less clear about the purposes of the other conditions of 
release, but there are clear policy reasons for associating many conditions of release with one risk 
or the other. As a result, those provisions are discussed in the next Part of the Article. See infra 
Section III.D. 
 203. The bail statute outlines penalties for both failing to appear, 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a), 
and for committing an offense while on release, § 3147. The provision for failing to appear 
provides an affirmative defense if there are “uncontrollable circumstances prevented the person 
from appearing or surrendering, and that the person did not contribute to the creation of such 
circumstances in reckless disregard of the requirement to appear or surrender, and that the 
person appeared or surrendered as soon as such circumstances ceased to exist.” § 3146(c). These 
penalty provisions make clear that defendants only lose bail or appearance bond for failure to 
appear. Section 3147 is silent about loss of bail or appearance bond. So while a new crime will 
trigger a penalty per § 3147, it does not mean that bail money is forfeited. 
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As a result, when a federal judge sets a bail amount, only flight risk is 
a relevant and legitimate consideration for bail. As such, mixing 
dangerousness into the risk calculus will likely lead to an excessive (and 
therefore unconstitutional) bail amount.204 
State statutes take a range of approaches to outlining the purposes 
of bail. Some state statutes are similar to the federal statute: they state 
explicitly that the purpose of bail is to secure a defendant’s appearance, 
in other words, to manage flight risk.205 Some states qualify this slightly 
by stating that the appearance is the primary, but not necessarily 
exclusive purpose of bail.206 
Many states merge the description of the purpose of setting a 
specific bail amount with other decisions that are made at a bail 
hearing, such as a decision to deny bail or to impose other conditions 
of release.207 In this way, many statutes do a poor job of guiding judges 
 
 204. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987). 
 205. See ARK. CODE § 17-19-101 (2010) (bail is “for the appearance of the defendant”); 
DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 2107 (2015) (“the court shall not require oppressive bail but shall require 
such bail as reasonably will assure the reappearance of the accused”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 804-1 
(1993); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2902 (Supp. 2015); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 311; 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 20D (2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 765.1 (West 2000) 
(explaining that a “recognizance for the appearance of an accused person may be taken”) 
(emphasis added); MISS. CODE § 99-5-25 (2015); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30 (McKinney 
Supp. 2016) (a recognizance for the appearance of an accused person may be taken); Lemme v. 
Langlois, 104 R.I. 352, 356 (1968) (“The object of bail in a criminal case is to assure the 
presence in court of the accused for trial.”). 
 206. See, for example, Alabama. ALA. CODE § 15-13-102 (2011) (“Definitions and 
purpose of bail”—“The primary purpose of bail is to procure the release of a person charged 
with an offense upon obtaining assurance, with or without security, of the defendant’s future 
appearance in court.”). 
 207. See Alaska, ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011 (West) (“Release before trial”); Arizona, 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3961 (Supp. 2016) (“Offenses not bailable; purpose, preconviction; 
exceptions”), invalidated in part by Simpson v. Miller, 377 P.3d 1003 (2016); California, CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 1275(a)(1) (West Supp. 2016) (“Setting, reducing or denying bail; 
considerations”—“In setting, reducing, or denying bail, a judge or magistrate shall take into 
consideration the protection of the public, the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous 
criminal record of the defendant, and the probability of his or her appearing at trial or at a 
hearing of the case. The public safety shall be the primary consideration.”); Florida, FLA. STAT. 
§ 903.046(1) (2016) (“The purpose of a bail determination in criminal proceedings is to ensure 
the appearance of the criminal defendant at subsequent proceedings and to protect the 
community against unreasonable danger from the criminal defendant.”); Illinois, 725 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/110-5 (West Supp. 2016) (“Determining the amount of bail and 
conditions of release”—discussing the factors a court may consider when it “determin[es] the 
amount of monetary bail or conditions of release, if any, which will reasonably assure the 
appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the community and 
2.GOULDIN.FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/16  5:29 PM 
837 Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness 
 883 
about which risks are relevant to different pretrial decisions. Public 
safety risks are often woven into these definitions because they 
frequently drive either (i) the denial of bail or (ii) the imposition of 
other conditions of release. 
While danger is clearly relevant to a decision to deny bail or to 
impose certain conditions of release, it is illogical to suggest that bail 
should be priced according to danger.208 Nevertheless, some state 
statutes do seem to authorize courts to calculate bail to manage public 
safety risk. In California, the statute explicitly says that “[i]n setting, 
reducing, or denying bail, a judge or magistrate shall take into 
consideration the protection of the public, the seriousness of the 
offense charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, and 
the probability of his or her appearing at trial or at a hearing of the 
case.”209 The statute goes on to emphasize that “[t]he public safety 
shall be the primary consideration.”210 Similarly, in Maine and Kansas, 
the applicable statutes permit the imposition of bail to manage public 
safety risk, as well as flight.211 Although the commission of a new crime 
 
the likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of bail”); Iowa, IOWA 
CODE § 811.2 (2016) (“Conditions of release—penalty for failure to appear”); Indiana, IND. 
CODE ANN. § 35-33-8-1 (LexisNexis 2012) (“Bail bond” defined); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 431.525 (West Supp. 2016) (“Conditions for establishing amount of bail”); Minnesota, 
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.02 (West 2010) (“Release by Court or Prosecutor”); Missouri, MO. SUP. 
CT. R. 33.01 (West 2002) (“Misdemeanors or Felonies—Right to Release—Conditions”); 
Montana, MONT. CODE § 46-9-106 (2015) (“Release or detention of defendant pending trial”); 
Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-901 (2014) (“Bail; personal recognizance; conditions”); New 
Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17 (West Supp. 2016) (“Pretrial release decision; timing; 
considerations; non-monetary conditions; monetary bail”); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 
10.21.010 (2016) (“Intent”); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1C-2 (LexisNexis 2014) 
(“Bail defined”); and Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 969.01 (2013–2014) (“Eligibility for release”). 
 208. See supra notes 109–114 and accompanying text. 
 209. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275(a)(1) (West) (“Setting, reducing or denying bail; 
considerations”); see also Curtis E.A. Karnow, Setting Bail for Public Safety, 13 BERKELEY J. 
CRIM. L. 1–2 (2008) (describing California’s statute and asserting that it gives judges an 
impossible task “because there is no relationship between the dollar amount of bail and any in 
terrorem inhibiting effect that would deter future criminal conduct by the defendant”). 
 210. § 1275(a)(1) (West). 
 211. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 1026 (West) (“The judicial officer may not impose a financial 
condition that, either alone or in combination with other conditions of bail, is in excess of that 
reasonably necessary to ensure the appearance of the defendant at the time and place required, 
to ensure that the defendant will refrain from any new criminal conduct, to ensure the integrity 
of the judicial process or to ensure the safety of others in the community.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
22-2802 (Supp. 2015) (“Any person charged with a crime shall . . . be ordered released pending 
preliminary examination or trial upon the execution of an appearance bond in an amount 
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does not seem to trigger bail forfeiture in Maine, the violation of 
public safety-related conditions of release that were imposed in 
addition to money bail will trigger forfeiture of that bail.212 
New Jersey’s recently amended bail statute avoids the potential for 
this type of confusion by directly specifying that the purpose of 
monetary bail is “to reasonably assure the eligible defendant’s 
appearance”213 and by expressly forbidding the use of money bail to 
manage public safety (or for other non-flight purposes): 
The court shall not impose the monetary bail to reasonably assure 
the protection of the safety of any other person or the community 
or that the eligible defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct 
the criminal justice process, or for the purpose of preventing the 
release of the eligible defendant.214 
Even in those states where bail statutes do not clearly state or 
isolate the purposes of bail, the purpose can be derived by looking at 
bail forfeiture provisions. When forfeiture of bail is triggered by non-
appearance only and not by the commission of a new offense during 
release, that is a clear reflection of the purpose of bail.215 In New York 
and most other jurisdictions, bail is forfeited by the defendant’s failure 
to appear or flight and not by the commission of a new crime 
during release.216 
 
specified by the magistrate and sufficient to assure the appearance of such person before the 
magistrate when ordered and to assure the public safety.”). 
 212. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 1094 (“When a defendant who has been admitted to either 
preconviction or post-conviction bail in a criminal case fails to appear as required or has violated 
the conditions of release, the court shall declare a forfeiture of the bail.”). 
 213. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (West 2015). 
 214. Id. § 2A:162-17(3)(c)(1) (2014). 
 215. See SCHNACKE, supra note 28, at 14 (2014) (“[I]n virtually every American 
jurisdiction, financial conditions of bail bonds cannot even be forfeited for new crimes or other 
breaches in public safety, making the setting of a money bond for public safety irrational.”). 
 216. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 500.10(10) (McKinney 2009) (“‘Cash bail’ means a sum 
of money . . . posted by a principal or by another person on his behalf . . . upon the condition 
that such money will become forfeit to the people of the state of New York if the principal does 
not comply with the directions of a court requiring his attendance at the criminal action or 
proceeding involved or does not otherwise render himself amenable to the orders and processes 
of the court.”); see also, e.g., ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 41(h)(1) (2014) (“If the person released on 
bail on the giving or pledging of security fails to appear before a court or a judicial officer as 
required, the judge or magistrate judge before whom the person released was to appear shall 
forfeit the security.”); FLA. STAT. § 903.26(2)(b) (2016) (“Failure of the defendant to appear at 
the time, date, and place of required appearance shall result in forfeiture of the bond.”); IOWA 
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In many states and at the federal level, then, setting bail to manage 
public safety risks violates the statutory purpose of bail as expressed in 
both “purpose” and “forfeiture” provisions. Again, in these 
jurisdictions, if bail is set at a figure higher than necessary to manage 
flight risk, it should be viewed as “excessive” and therefore 
unconstitutional.217 While this has not traditionally been a successful 
course for defendants, the statutes direct that it should be. 
Furthermore, federal and state bail statutes also empower judges 
to impose conditions of release other than bail to “reasonably assure 
the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other 
person and the community.”218 Many of the other available conditions 
of release that judges are authorized by statute to impose are also 
better for managing either flight risk or danger and are not equally 
useful for both.219 As outlined in more detail in Section III.D below, 
the choice of which conditions to impose must—for policy reasons—
be guided by the type (and degree) of risk that is present. 
III. ISOLATING FLIGHT FROM DANGER: POLICY ARGUMENTS AND 
PROPOSALS 
As outlined in Part II, federal and state statutory provisions 
frequently require that flight risk be considered independently of 
danger. Even when the statutes do not expressly require separate 
consideration of risks and even in cases where both risks are present, 
flight and danger must be considered separately by judges for several 
policy reasons. First, combining the risks may lead to inaccurate 
calculations and/or overestimation of both kinds of risks. The second 
reason for isolating flight risk from danger is that forcing separate 
analyses of pretrial risks may help limit judicial discretion in ways that 
 
CODE § 311.6(1) (2016) (“If the defendant fails to appear at the time and place when the 
defendant’s personal appearance is lawfully required, or to surrender in execution of the 
judgment, the court must direct an entry of the failure to be made of record, and the undertaking 
of the defendant’s bail, or the money deposited, is thereupon forfeited.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
276, § 20F (2015) (“If the accused is admitted to bail, and fails to appear and surrender himself 
according to the conditions of his bond or undertaking, such court or justice, by proper order, 
shall declare the bond or undertaking forfeited.”). Arizona courts have interpreted Arizona 
statutes in the same way. See, e.g., State v. Surety Ins. Co., 622 P.2d 52 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) 
(holding that defendant’s commission of new crimes while on pretrial release did not trigger 
forfeiture of surety bond). 
 217. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987). 
 218. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2012). 
 219. For a longer discussion of these conditions, see infra Section III.D. 
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provide judges with necessary political cover (thus alleviating pressure 
for judges to err on the side of detention). In addition, analyzing these 
risks separately will improve the feedback that judges receive about 
their release decisions. Finally, courts can devise and impose a range 
of conditions of release to mitigate pretrial risks, many of which do 
not manage both flight and danger (at least not to the same degree). 
Each of these policy arguments is outlined in more detail in the 
sections that follow. 
A. Separating Risks to Avoid Overestimation 
The first practical justification for separating flight risk from 
dangerousness is that merging the two risks may contribute to 
inaccurate risk measurements. At the outset, judges should evaluate 
these risks separately simply as a matter of statistical precision. 
Furthermore, judicial efforts to calculate risks are vulnerable to 
well-documented cognitive biases or distortions. As outlined below, 
requiring separate consideration of flight risk and dangerousness may 
reduce judges’ overreliance on problematic intuitive calculations. 
Scholars have researched and written extensively about two 
systems that govern our decision-making or reasoning processes.220 
The first, our intuitive system, operates on a subconscious level, 
processing information quickly and with little effort.221 By contrast, 
our deliberative system requires “effort, motivation, concentration, 
and the execution of learned rules.”222 While reliance on our intuitive 
system is essential because we need to make so many rapid and 
efficient “decisions” as we navigate our days, the shortcuts taken by 
the intuitive system (also called heuristics) are vulnerable to 
distortion.223 As Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinksi, and Andrew 
 
 220. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1127 (1974). 
 221. See id.; DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20–21 (2011); see also Chris 
Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide 
Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2007) [hereinafter Guthrie, Rachlinksi & Wistrich, 
Blinking] (describing the intuitive system as “spontaneous, intuitive, effortless, and fast”). 
 222. Guthrie, Rachlinksi & Wistrich, Blinking, supra note 221, at 31. 
 223. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 220, at 1127; Guthrie, Rachlinksi & Wistrich, 
Blinking, supra note 221, at 31 (“[I]ntuition is also the likely pathway by which undesirable 
influences, like the race, gender, or attractiveness of parties, affect the legal system.”); cf. Alex 
Stein, Behavioral Probability, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON BEHAVIORAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (Joshua C. Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeiler eds., 2014). 
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Wistrich have shown, even judges are vulnerable to these 
distortions.224 Judges tend to “favor compelling intuitive reactions 
over careful deliberative assessments—even when the intuitive 
reactions are clearly wrong.”225 
The distortions or biases described above may be amplified in 
situations like bail hearings where “the law is unclear, the facts are 
disputed, or judges possess wide discretion.”226 Judges may also 
overestimate pretrial risks—dangerousness in particular—because they 
rely on what is called the “availability heuristic” which is the “tendency 
to measure the probability of an event ‘by the ease with which 
instances or occurrences can be brought to mind.’”227 When salient 
examples of “worst-case scenarios” can readily be brought to mind, 
individuals are vulnerable to a phenomenon known as 
“probability neglect.”228 
In the bail context, the worst-case scenarios are defendants on 
pretrial release who commit horrific and highly-publicized acts of 
violence.229 Because examples of these judicial (or systemic) failures are 
readily available, judges may “overestimate the likelihood” that a 
defendant on pretrial release will commit a violent crime or they may 
“ignore the low likelihood of the event and demand action to prevent 
 
 224. Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, Blinking, supra note 221, at 107–08; Chris Guthrie, 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 
779–80 (2001) (reporting experimental evidence showing that judges are susceptible to 
heuristics and biases when making judgments). 
 225. Andrew J. Wistrich, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, Heart Versus Head: Do 
Judges Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 855, 862 (2015). 
 226. Id. at 911. 
 227. Lauryn P. Gouldin, When Deference is Dangerous: The Judicial Role in Material-
Witness Detentions, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1333, 1363 (2012) (quoting Tversky & Kahneman, 
supra note 220, at 1127); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 54 (2007); 
KAHNEMAN, supra note 221, at 130–31; Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional 
Decision-Making, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 115, 162 (2005) (“In sum, an event is more available to 
an individual if she has previously personally experienced it, or if it is highly imaginable or is the 
subject of widespread and intense media coverage.”). 
 228. Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 Yale L.J. 
61, 67 (2002) (“Probability neglect is especially large when people focus on the worst possible 
case or otherwise are subject to strong emotions. When such emotions are at work, people do 
not give sufficient consideration to the [low] likelihood that the worst case will actually occur.”); 
see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 227, at 54, 63. 
 229. See Appleman, supra note 5, at 1359 (“Judges can have a tendency to be biased in 
favor of predicting dangerousness, in part because they will be responsible if they erroneously 
release a violent individual.”). 
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it.”230 Separating flight risk and dangerousness would ensure both that 
evaluations of flight risk are not tainted by fears of dangerousness and 
that estimates of dangerousness are not inflated by concerns 
about flight.231 
Risk assessment tools address some of these concerns by replacing 
reliance on subjective and intuitive judicial measures of risk with more 
objective data that is insulated from cognitive bias.232 But these tools 
are generally pitched as a supplement to judicial decision-making, not 
as a substitute for it.233 Most of the tools currently being used do not 
separate flight risk and dangerousness.234 
Those risk assessment tools that separate more serious risks of 
violence from broader risks of nonviolent reoffending and separate 
both of these public safety risks from flight risk235 will, of course, be 
more useful for judges identifying appropriate risk-specific conditions 
of release. These tools can also be expected to compel, or at least 
nudge judges to consider flight risk and dangerousness separately.236 
Studies have shown that judges who are required to follow intricate 
rules or make more nuanced calculations may be more deliberative.237 
When judges or risk assessment tools instead combine flight risk and 
 
 230. Wells, supra note 227, at 162–63 (citing PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 
(2000)) (explaining that the “unknown” risks are also perceived as more serious). 
 231. Cf. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Can Judges Make 
Reliable Numeric Judgments? Distorted Damages and Skewed Sentences, 90 IND. L.J. 695, 703 
(2015) [hereinafter Rachlinksi, Wistrich & Guthrie, Numeric] (describing the problem of 
“anchoring” which occurs when “people construct numeric judgment from the surrounding 
context” and it can be a distorting influence when that context is “misleading and irrelevant”). 
 232. Id. at 699 (explaining that more objective tools like sentencing guidelines may 
“limit[] the degree to which erratic judgment might adversely affect outcomes”). 
 233. But see Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 16, at 10 (advocating using risk assessment 
tools as the foundation for mandatory bail guidelines that would replace (not complement) 
judges’ risk measurement); cf. Rachlinksi, Wistrich & Guthrie, Numeric, supra note 231, at 738 
(observing that advisory guidelines “may leave too much room for discretion and hence 
for distortion”). 
 234. See supra Section I.D.3 (describing federal and state tools). 
 235. See id. (describing the Public Safety Assessment-Court tool that has been developed 
by the Arnold Foundation). 
 236. Guthrie, Rachlinksi & Wistrich, Blinking, supra note 221, at 41 (explaining that 
“multifactor tests . . . possess the potential for mitigating cognitive error by nudging judges 
toward more deliberative processes”). 
 237. Id. at 27 (suggesting that the “highly intricate, rule-bound nature” of probable cause 
evaluations may “signal[] to judges that intuition might be inconsistent with the governing law” 
and thus “facilitate” more deliberative decision-making). 
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danger, the risk estimation problems already present in bail hearings 
are exacerbated and the calculation of each type of risk could be 
distorted or overestimated. 
B. Sharpening Distinctions to Provide Restraint and Cover 
Over-detention may not simply be a subconscious process. Pretrial 
release decisions can pose serious personal and institutional hazards 
for judges. Judges who perceive that they bear sole personal 
responsibility for a detention decision will deliberately err on the side 
of over-detention.238 When judges release potentially dangerous 
individuals who subsequently inflict harm, “the error will be 
emblazoned across the front pages,” but when “a judge detains an 
individual who would not have committed any wrong had he been 
released, that error is invisible—and, indeed, unknowable.”239 
Although no judge wants his or her name associated with the crimes 
committed by defendants released before trial, this issue will be 
exaggerated, of course, for elected judges.240 
Depending on the jurisdiction, the political pressure to detain may 
come from multiple constituencies. The public and the news media 
are clear sources of this pressure.241 The bail bonding industry is also 
 
 238. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 
97 CAL. L. REV. 693, 723 (2009); see also Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 16, at 5 (“Judges . . . 
are wary of bearing public responsibility for crimes that go unpunished—and new crimes that 
are committed—because of an erroneous decision to release defendants prior to trial. Erroneous 
decisions to detain, on the other hand, produce no similar negative reputational 
consequences.”); Goldkamp & Vilcica, supra note 16, at 149 (“[T]he pretrial release decision is 
deceptively challenging for judicial decision-makers, with little upside and a large 
possible downside.”). 
 239. Cole, supra note 238, at 696. As one judge, who acknowledged that this was among 
his “biggest fears,” explained: “No judge wants to release someone and have that person commit 
a violent crime while on release.” Keith L. Alexander, 11 defendants on GPS monitoring charged 
with violent crimes in past year in D.C., WASH. POST (Feb. 9, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/11-defendants-on-gps-monitoring-charged-with-
violent-crimes-in-past-year-in-dc/2013/02/09/9237be1e-6c8b-11e2-ada0-
5ca5fa7ebe79_story.html (quoting D.C. Superior Court judge). 
 240. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 16, at 5 (noting that this may be particularly 
problematic for elected judges). 
 241. See KY. DEP’T OF PUB. ADVOCACY, KENTUCKY PRETRIAL RELEASE MANUAL 14 (June 
2013) (explaining that “judges need as much help as possible” because “they are easy targets for 
the media or for politicians”). 
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a notorious source of pressure for both elected judges                                
and   legislatures.242 
Pretrial risk aversion is likely connected with judges’ fear of regret. 
Regret has been described as being “accompanied by feeling that one 
should have known better . . . by thoughts about the mistake one has 
made and the opportunities lost . . . , and by wanting to undo the 
event and get a second chance.”243 The risk of regret leads individuals 
to favor risk-averse choices.244 In the case of pretrial detention, the fear 
of regret triggers a tendency to fall back on the choice of detention. 
If we retain a pretrial system where judges make release 
decisions,245 addressing this problem of judicial will is perhaps the most 
important challenge facing modern bail reform efforts.246 Risk 
assessment tools do some of this work by permitting judges to point 
to “objective” risk calculations as the justification for a release 
decision. These tools will carry more of the weight of pretrial decision-
making, however, if they map onto existing statutory and 
constitutional provisions that call for separate risk analysis.247 Indeed, 
for the reasons noted above, these tools may be able to highlight and 
reinforce existing constitutional and statutory requirements that are 
too often ignored by judges. A more clearly defined checklist, in which 
risks are divided and tools for managing the risks are appropriately 
considered, promises to provide greater cover as well.248 
 
 242. Id. at 11–12. 
 243. KAHNEMAN, supra note 221, at 436. 
 244. Id. at 349. 
 245. Some scholars have offered intriguing proposals that would alleviate this problem by 
shifting discretion away from judges. Laura Appleman’s proposal would distribute responsibility 
for release decisions among a group of community members serving as bail jurors. Appleman, 
supra note 5, at 1363–66. Sam Wiseman also advocates taking responsibility for release decisions 
away from judges. He would have a bail commission set mandatory guidelines based on risk 
assessment data. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 16, at 37–47. 
 246. The problem of political will has perennially thwarted reform efforts. See Simonson, 
supra note 9, at 35–36 (describing the need for “political will to release more defendants 
pretrial” and asserting the community bail funds “are in a unique position to chip away at the 
political obstacles to real change”); cf. Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1347–48 
(explaining that increasing the use of electronic monitoring technology or “finding other ways 
of ensuring a non-dangerous defendant’s presence at trial” are not questions “of ability, but 
of will”). 
 247. See supra Part II. 
 248. See infra notes 262–263 and accompanying text. 
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C. Isolating Risks to Improve Accountability and Legitimacy 
Other than cases where defendants on release commit violent 
offenses, judges receive little information about the outcomes of their 
bail decisions.249 Given that the rare feedback they do receive is skewed 
toward the worst outcomes, judges are more “conservative” and 
“defensive” in making release decisions.250 Improving the collection 
and communication of data about pretrial outcomes is therefore a 
priority for reform.251 
Judges are also criticized for being inaccurate gauges of 
community preferences about bail and pretrial release. Judges 
generally lack information about or accountability for the financial 
costs of their release and detention decisions.252 Laura Appleman, Sam 
Wiseman, and Jocelyn Simonson have each outlined bail solutions that 
help make judges more aware of and beholden to, community 
interests in pretrial decision-making. In theory, the bail commission 
that would draft Wiseman’s bail guidelines,253 Appleman’s community 
 
 249. Goldkamp & Vîlcicã, supra note 16, at 127 (explaining that judges are not given data 
on “the many defendants who negotiate the adjudication process without problems during 
pretrial release,” but they do receive “negative” feedback because “the media will soundly 
criticize release decisions when one has gone wrong”). 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 150 (recommending improvements to both judicial training and “systemic 
feedback”; otherwise, judges may default to bail and detention “rather than to experiment with 
what they perceive to be risky or undeveloped community release options”). 
 252. As Wiseman explains, a typical pretrial hearing is a venue with a classic and serious 
principal-agent problem because judges “bear blame” for defendants who fail on pretrial release. 
“And judges, unlike legislative bodies, are not responsible for increased jail budgets, lost tax 
revenues, and drains on social services resulting, directly or indirectly, from their decisions.” 
Wiseman, Fixing Bail, supra note 16, at 10. 
 253. Wiseman’s proposal for more influential bail commissions and guidelines could be a 
tool for improving data collection and better communicating that data and other community 
feedback to judges. He clearly envisions that the commission would have more awareness of, 
and concern for, the public fisc than judges have. See id. at 61. 
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bail jury,254 and the community bail funds that Simonson analyzes255 
would each more accurately weigh the purported public safety benefits 
of detention against its financial expense and other costs to the 
community. Community members may also be more protective, on 
principle, of defendants’ liberty interests.256 
Building properly defined risk assessment tools with risk measures 
based on regularly updated or validated data about pretrial release 
outcomes257 remedies many of these feedback and accountability 
problems. This data should be more available to judges interpreting 
risk measures as well. Strangely, many risk assessment tools that have 
been proposed gather separate data for those defendants who commit 
crimes on release258 and for those who fail to appear, but then combine 
that data into a single prediction of “pretrial failure.”259 It is difficult 
for that feedback to be properly incorporated by judges, by those who 
will use outcome data to validate and update the quality of the risk 
assessment tools, and by others in the community who are analyzing 
the criminal justice system and bail reform efforts.260 Isolating flight 
risk from dangerousness helps to identify the importance of each type 
of risk on its own. 
Separate consideration of the risks should also facilitate more 
transparent and precise discussions of community priorities and fiscal 
 
 254. Appleman focuses more on the community’s superiority as a gauge of community 
safety threats and on the potential benefit of fostering greater community investment in, and 
understanding of, the criminal justice system. See Appleman, supra note 5, at 1355–58. She does, 
however, also describe the “local public[’s] . . . meaningful interest in uncovering the procedures 
involved in denying or granting bail, especially because so many taxpayer dollars are being used 
to incarcerate those who have not yet been determined guilty.” Id. at 1364. 
 255. Simonson, supra note 9, at 6 (“[W]hen a “community” group posts bail, it calls into 
question the widespread assumption that the community and the defendant sit on opposite ends 
of a scale of justice.”). 
 256. See id. at 47; see also Appleman, supra note 5, at 1365. 
 257. See supra Section I.D.3 explaining procedures for developing and refining risk 
assessment tools. 
 258. As noted above, most tools combine violent and nonviolent reoffending. See id. 
(distinguishing the Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety Assessment-Court tool which separates 
risks of violent and nonviolent reoffending). 
 259. See id. (explaining that the Public Safety Assessment-Court is an exception and divides 
flight risk and dangerousness). 
 260. GOLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 16, at 43 (clarifying that feedback to judges 
is not the sole purpose of guidelines-type reforms: “[I]n large part, evolutionary change is 
expected to follow from the increased visibility of the decision itself, from public and professional 
comment and critique of the basis of bail decisions”). 
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constraints.261 A system that is known to have so much pretextual 
decision-making is not one that will be viewed as legitimate by the 
community. Clarity about the purposes of the law and the intentions 
of system actors has immediate potential value in enhancing the 
perceived legitimacy of the system. Of course, transparency may also 
force much-needed conversations about the problematic and 
troubling mismatch between our intentions or purposes in the bail 
context, and the oppressive processes of the pretrial system. 
D. Managing Flight and Danger Differently 
A particular defendant’s level of flight risk or dangerousness is not 
a fixed number that exists in a vacuum—it must be assessed in 
reference to available conditions of release. In other words, the true 
task facing judges making release and detention decisions is not merely 
a risk measurement task; it is a risk management task.262 The final 
policy-based reason that flight risk should be analyzed separately from 
dangerousness is because of differences in conditions of release: many 
of the conditions that judges can impose to manage or mitigate risk 
are suited to flight risk or dangerousness, but not to both.263 By 
weighing the risks separately and considering them in light of the 
available risk management options, we can begin to engage more 
challenging questions. How effective are these conditions of release at 
managing flight risk or dangerousness? What degree of risk warrants 
the imposition of one of these conditions of release?264 Research on 
these understudied questions will be essential. 
 
 261. Id. (describing the promise of bail guidelines to “provide important feedback relevant 
to core policy concerns”). 
 262. Cf. Starr, supra note 152 at 806–07 (critiquing risk assessment tools for failing to 
predict how the court intervention—the sentencing decision—“will affect the defendant’s 
recidivism risk”). And it is a task that ought to be revisited during pretrial detention (although 
too often, it is not). 
 263. This argument is included here as a policy-based reason (and not previously as a 
statutory requirement) because federal and state statutes do not expressly limit the use of most 
conditions of release to manage either flight or danger. Under Salerno, however, a mismatch 
between the risks presented by a defendant (i.e., the government’s regulatory needs) and the 
conditions of release imposed would qualify as “excessive bail.” See supra notes 56–62 and 
accompanying text. With separated risks, these constitutional claims may be more successful than 
they have been to date. 
 264. Cf. Sandra Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 57, at 41–43 (arguing that 
increasing use of risk assessment tools requires clearer articulation of the risks that justify pretrial 
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The federal and state statutes analyzed in Part II provide some 
guidance to judges about how to organize and sequence the risk 
measurement and management tasks they must undertake when 
making pretrial release and detention decisions. Many of those statutes 
begin with presumptions favoring release, then move to available 
conditions of release, and close by providing limited circumstances in 
which detention may be ordered. Although, as noted above, those 
statutes include some explicit restrictions (e.g., dictating when and 
how flight risk and dangerousness may drive a detention order265 and 
linking financial conditions to flight risk266), the statutes are not clear 
enough. Existing judicial checklists similarly neglect this important 
issue: although federal judges work from a benchbook that includes 
guidelines for making bail decisions, those guidelines include no 
direction about separating consideration of flight risk 
and dangerousness.267 
1. Conditions that manage flight risk 
If a defendant poses a significant enough flight risk that release on 
recognizance is inappropriate, a judge must evaluate what flight-
related conditions of release are necessary to manage that risk.268 
Although statutes generally do not designate conditions of release 
according to the risks that they mitigate, there are numerous 
conditions of release that are geared toward managing flight risk.269 
These include, most frequently, financial conditions like bail or 
secured bonds that are believed to incentivize defendants to return to 
 
detention or other pretrial restraints); see also id. at 42 (Those risks “should be expressed in terms 
of both the severity and the likelihood of the feared harm in a specified timespan.”). 
 265. See supra Section II.B. 
 266. See supra Section II.C. 
 267. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES § 1.3 (6th 
ed. 2013). A proposal to revise federal and state bail checklists is the focus of a separate work 
in progress. 
 268. As noted supra, if no conditions of release can adequately mitigate this risk, then a 
judge may order detention based on flight risk. Given cheap and effective electronic tracking 
options and other technological advances, however, flight-based detention should be rare. See 
Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1352; see also supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 269. It bears repeating that for purposes of this Article, both the risk that a defendant will 
flee the jurisdiction and the risk that a defendant will fail to appear are encompassed by the term 
“flight risk.” Defining flight risk and nonappearance is the project of another work in progress. 
See Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, supra note 25. 
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court instead of fleeing. They also include unsecured bonds, where 
defendants pay nothing up front but are penalized if they fail to return 
to court. As noted in previous sections, these financial conditions are 
entirely flight focused. 
Judges are also empowered to prevent a defendant from fleeing 
the jurisdiction by making use of a range of supervision conditions. 
These conditions range from supervision by a designated custodian,270 
to regular reporting requirements to pretrial services (or some other 
agency),271 to residency programs at halfway houses.272 Some well-
funded defendants have been able to negotiate release by paying for 
private security to monitor their home detention, but this costly self-
funded release option is not available to the vast majority of 
defendants.273 Sam Wiseman has written extensively about electronic 
monitoring technology and its potential to resuscitate the Excessive 
Bail Clause. As he explains, “[i]ncreasingly sophisticated remote 
monitoring devices have the potential to sharply reduce the need for 
flight-based pretrial detention.”274 This type of monitoring would likely 
be more cost-effective than ordering detention based on flight.275 
Courts concerned about flight can also impose various sorts of 
travel restrictions on defendants.276 These restrictions include passport 
revocations and reliance on no-fly lists to prevent international travel. 
Travel can also be more tightly controlled in conjunction with 
electronic monitoring. 
 
 270. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(C)(1)(B)(i) (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-
17(b)(2)(a). 
 271. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(C)(1)(B)(vi). 
 272. VanNostrand et al., supra note 133, at 16. 
 273. See, e.g., United States v. Madoff, 586 F. Supp.2d 240, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(approving release to home confinement monitored by private security paid for by defendant’s 
wife); United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 78 (2d Cir. 2007) (release appropriate where 
defendants agreed to pay all costs associated with 24-hour private security). Courts have rejected 
the claim that defendants are entitled to fund this sort of supervision, however. See, e.g., United 
States v. Banki, 369 F. App’x 152, 153–54 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that it was not legal error to 
deny defendant the option of paying for home confinement because the government would 
incur additional costs associated with supervising privately-financed home confinement). 
 274. Wiseman, Detention, supra note 26, at 1347–48. 
 275. Id. at 1372–74 (explaining that more research on cost-effectiveness is needed but 
“the available data suggest that [electronic monitoring] can be at least as cheap and effective as 
money bail”). 
 276. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(C)(1)(B)(iv); United States v. Xulam, 83 F.3d 441, 443 
(1st Cir. 1996) (noting that government’s seizure of travel documents mitigated flight risk). 
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2. Conditions that mitigate danger 
If concerns about dangerousness are the reason that release on 
recognizance is not appropriate, a judge can impose conditions of 
release that mitigate or manage dangerousness. There are a number of 
statutory conditions that are clearly intended to manage or mitigate 
dangerousness or related witness safety concerns. A few obvious 
examples include avoiding contact with alleged victims and 
witnesses,277 complying with a curfew,278 and refraining from 
possessing weapons.279 Employment and education obligations280 may 
mitigate flight risk by anchoring a defendant to the jurisdiction but 
those seem to be more promising as means of keeping released 
defendants out of trouble, thus managing danger. 
Electronic monitoring technology can also be used to manage at 
least some public safety risks, including monitoring any defendant’s 
home detention, tracking alleged sex offenders’ whereabouts, and 
ensuring that defendants in domestic violence cases abide by stay-away 
orders.281 This sort of monitoring, however, operates differently with 
respect to flight risk and danger. Wearing a GPS monitor hopefully 
dissuades alleged offenders from committing crimes (a deterrence 
argument), but it actually prevents a suspect from successfully 
disappearing, so long as the technology functions properly. 
Judges are also empowered to require released defendants to 
“refrain from excessive use of alcohol, or any use of a narcotic drug or 
other controlled substance”282 or to obtain drug or alcohol 
 
 277. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(C)(1)(B)(v). 
 278. See, e.g., id. § 3142(C)(1)(B)(vii); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:162-17 (b)(2)(f). 
 279. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(C)(1)(B)(viii); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(b)(2)(g). 
 280. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(C)(1)(B)(i); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(b)(2)(b)–(c). 
 281. See, e.g., EDNA EREZ ET AL., GPS MONITORING TECHNOLOGIES AND DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE: AN EVALUATION STUDY i (June 2012), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238910.pdf (“GPS tracking seems to increase 
[domestic violence] defendants’ compliance with program rules compared to those who are 
monitored but not tracked.”); Peter M. Thomson, A Comprehensive Strategy Targeting 
Recidivist Criminals with Continuous Real-Time GPS Monitoring: Is Reverse Engineering Crime 
Control Possible?, 12 ENGAGE 23, 24 (Nov. 2011), http://www.fed-soc.org/
publications/detail/a-comprehensive-strategy-targeting-recidivist-criminals-with-continuous-
real-time-gps-monitoring-is-reverse-engineering-crime-control-possible (asserting that 
improvements in the precision and accuracy of GPS technology make possible broader uses to 
manage public safety risks). 
 282. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142(C)(1)(B)(ix). 
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treatment.283 These conditions are arguably driven by both flight risk 
and danger but they clearly operate in different ways on those different 
risks. Judges may view defendants’ substance abuse problems as 
increasing the risk that they will not appear for trial (i.e., sober 
defendants will be less likely to miss court dates) but they don’t likely 
influence a defendant’s inclination to flee the jurisdiction.284 Courts 
also typically view drug or alcohol abuse as more directly increasing a 
more troublesome risk: that a defendant will engage in 
violent offenses.285 
Given that judges have different ways of managing flight risk and 
dangerousness, they need to develop separate predictions for the two 
risks. Tools developed to assist judges with this task should separate 
flight risk and danger. Risk assessment tools that generate a cumulative 
risk of pretrial failure have limited utility. Instead, the merger of risks 
may reinforce or worsen other significant problems with pretrial 
decision-making. 
CONCLUSION 
Bail reform efforts, it turns out, are a sort of cyclical phenomenon 
in this country and this is our third time around. Questions of how to 
constrain judicial discretion or improve judicial risk assessment have 
puzzled each generation. Efforts around the country to reform or 
abandon money bail systems and to reduce the number of defendants 
detained before trial depend on clarification of the approach that 
judges must take to the measurement and management of 
pretrial risks. 
When they published their study of bail guidelines in 1985, John 
S. Goldkamp and Michael R. Gottfredson described the problem this 
way: “Too much discretion without explicit goals or criteria produces 
decisions that are chaotic and, by definition, inequitable.”286 While 
 
 283. See, e.g., id. § 3142(C)(1)(B)(x). 
 284. Here again, the distinction between a defendant who fails to appear because he is 
intoxicated on his court date poses a different sort of threat than one who flees the jurisdiction. 
Drug abuse seems much more likely to influence the former than the latter. For a more detailed 
discussion of the difference between the costs imposed by nonappearance and those imposed by 
true flight, see Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, supra note 25. 
 285. Baradaran, Drugs, supra note 168, at 233, 254–58, 276–81 (collecting cases that 
describe this perceived “nexus” linking drugs and violence but concluding that there is 
insufficient empirical support for a causal link). 
 286. GOLDKAMP & GOTTFREDSON, supra note 16, at 29. 
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modern risk assessment tools certainly help to address some of these 
concerns by taking risk calculation work away from judges, many of 
these tools are flawed in ways that reinforce problematic judicial 
practices instead of correcting them. There are constitutional, 
statutory, and policy-based reasons that judges making pretrial release 
and detention decisions must disentangle flight risk from 
dangerousness. Although these constraints are not always evident in 
practice, reform efforts and tools must reflect them. 
 
